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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy. 
Abstract 
The Moderating Impact of Directors’ Demographic Characteristics on the Relationship 
between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in China’s Listed Companies 
 
by 
Liang Guo 
The increasing reliance on corporate governance raises questions about whether corporate 
governance has a positive impact on financial performance, and whether or not intervening 
variables moderate the strength of the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. Therefore, based on upper echelon theory, this study builds a comprehensive 
framework to answer these questions through integrating directors‘ demographic 
characteristics into conventional corporate governance model. Using a sample of  155 Chinese 
listed firms during the period of 2004-2008, this study develops an index as a proxy for the 
quality of corporate governance and finds that good corporate governance can significantly 
positively affect firm performance. Further, the study examines the interaction effect of 
corproate governance and directors‘demographic heterogeneity, and indicats that 
demographic heterogeneity within board of directors can moderate the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. From a theoretical perspective, this study not 
only explains how corporate governance affects firm performance, but also uncovers the 
importance of demographic characteristics in a corporate governance system. From a practical 
perspective, this thesis not only emphasises that optimal structure of corporate governance can 
significantly enhance the firm performance, but also indentifies that the directors‘ 
demographic characteristics heterogeneity has a strong moderating impact on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in Chinese listed companies.  
 
Key words: Corporate governance,   Financial performance,   Demographic characteristics, 
                   Chinese listed companies. 
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     Chapter 1 
Introduction 
“Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Mary Schapiro plans to look into 
whether the boards of banks and other financial firms conducted effective oversight leading 
up to the financial crisis, according to SEC officials, part of efforts to intensify scrutiny of the 
top levels of management and give new powers to shareholders to shape boards. As she 
examines what went wrong, Schapiro is also considering asking boards to disclose more 
about directors' backgrounds and skills, specifically how much they know about managing 
risk, said the officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because no policy initiative has 
been launched.”  (Washington Post, February 20, 2009)  
The 2008-09 global financial crisis forces the scholars and police makers to refocus on the 
important impact of weaknesses and failures in corporate governance on firm performance 
(Kirkpatrick, 2009), and offers us another opportunity to restructure the arrangement of 
corporate governance in order to better strengthen the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Therefore, this thesis takes up the challenge not only to advance our understanding of 
corporate governance concepts, but also to increase the knowledge of corporate governance 
practices.       
In 2004, the OECD (2004) issued its revised principles of corporate governance and 
systematically emaphsized the critical role of corporate governance in improving the firm 
performance. In this principle, the significant impact of corporate governance on financial 
performance was described as a framework to coordinate the relationship among the 
shareholders, board of directors, managers and other stakeholders. Specifically, the principles 
indicated that the corporate governance system is divisible into two parts: governance 
structure and governance process. Governance structure includes ownership structure and 
board structure (composition and leadership) and builds a basic framework for the practice of 
corporate governance. The governance process refers to the interaction among the governance 
participants through the governance structure. Thus the structure of corporate governance 
determines the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance process and ultimately 
influences firm performance. In summary, corporate governance provides a reasonable 
assurance of monitoring the performance and achieving the objectives of the firm (Barrett, 
2002). 
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Further, the boards of directors are regarded primarily as a governance structure safeguard 
between the company and the owners of equity capital and as such lie at the heart of the 
corporate governance system (Williamson Oliver, 1985). However, despite the fact that 
research of boards has been considerable, the mixed empirical results emphasize that scholars 
should also consider other intervening variables that will influence the behaviors of board of 
directors and then moderate the strength of relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. At the same time, Upper Echelon Theory provides a complementary 
explanation for the important effect of the directors‘ demography on the strategic decision 
process, and further indicates that directors‘demographic characteristics which act as proxies 
for their cognitive bias and values and perceptions will affect the effectiveness of decision 
making process of board members and ultimately organizational outcomes.  
Thus, through incorporating Upper Echelon Theory into the conventional theories of 
corporate governance, the study will not only examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance, but also explore the interactive effect of demographic 
characteristics of directors on firm performance. That is, in order to enrich the conceptual 
framework of corporate governance and enhance the effectiveness of corporate governance, 
this study not only assesses the impact of corproate governance on firm performance, but also 
investigates whether or not demographic characteristics of directors can moderate the strength 
of the relationship between governance structure and firm performance. 
Using a sample of 155 Chinese listed companies during 2004 to 2008 (a total of 684 firm-year 
observations), this thesis extends the integrated model which combine corporate governance, 
the directors‘demography and firm performance to the emerging and transitional economy of 
China. Specifically, it seeks to analyse not only the impact of corporate governance on 
financial performance, but also the moderating impact of the demographic characteristics of 
directors on the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance in 
China‘s listed companies. As a result, this study aims to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the interactive effects of directors‘ demographic heterogeneity and corporate 
governance on firm performance. Specifically, the research expects to achieve the following 
objectives: 
1. I attempt to construct a corporate governance index to assess the quality of corporate 
governance from the perspectives of ownership structure and the board structure in China. 
2. I examine whether there is a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance based on the governance index in China‘s listed companies.  
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3. I investigate whether or not the demographic characteristics of directors plays a 
moderating role in the relationship, that is, this study will ascertain whether the 
demographic heterogeneity of board of directors can strengthen or weaken the effect of 
corporate governance on financial performancein China‘s listed companies.   
The rest of this introductory chapter is organized as follows: the first section describes 
corporate governance reform in China as a background to the thesis and indicates the 
motivation for the research; the second and third sections set out the research problems and 
demonstrated the contributions of the thesis; and the fourth section presents how the 
remainder of the thesis is structured. 
1.1 Corporate Governance in China 
Before 1978, China was a centrally planned economy and all decisions on resource allocation 
(such as production, investment, revenue and employment) were made centrally by the 
government. Within this system, managers in state-owned enterprises could not decide the 
strategy in terms of the market conditions and were responsible only for coordinating the 
employees in the implementation of production required by the government. Meanwhile, 
manager‘s compensation in State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) was determined by a central 
hierarchical system designed by central government. As a result, most Chinese enterprises 
suffered from  inefficiencies in resource allocation and a lack of managerial incentives to 
improve production (W. Zhang, 2006). 
Following the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Communist Party of China (CPC) 
Central Committee in 1978, China adopted an economic reform policy and aimed to move 
from a centrally planned to a market economy with Chinese characteristics through promoting 
institutional reform (W. Zhang, 1998). In the reform process, China has taken a gradual and 
experimental approach for economic reform rather than the ‗big bang‘ or ‗shock therapy‘ 
approach that was commonly adopted by other transitional economies (such as those in 
Eastern Europe), and as a result, has benefited from sensible policies and a relative absence of 
adverse shocks (Svejnar, 2007). Therefore, over three decades, China‘s reform and ‗opening-
up‘ seems to have been successful in advancing economic growth through improving 
efficiencies in resource allocation and managerial incentive mechanisms to promote 
productivity.  
China‘s enterprises aimed to build a modern enterprise system and were initially transferred 
as limited liability companies with the objectives of profit-making after three decades of 
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successful reform. Furthermore, the focus of the reform was the corporate governance of 
traditional State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), because the corporate governance reform has an 
important role in the emerging and transitional economy of China(Peng, 2004). Specifically, 
the evolutionary process is often divided into three stages as follows. 
Stage 1:1978-1992 
Before 1978, the fundamental problem of an SOE is the ambiguity of property rights with 
state ownership because ownership and control rights are combined in the Chinese 
conventional ownership system. Consequently, as Lin (2001) indicated, the government 
acting as controlling authority of the enterprise choose not to bear any residual risks in the use 
of enterprise assets in the State-Owned Enterprises.  
Therefore, during 1978-1992, enterprise reform was initially carried out from the ownership 
perspective, that is, the government primarily gave SOEs more autonomy and the 
management more incentives to improve enterprise efficiency through the separation of 
government from enterprise management. For example, the State Council issued a regulation 
for further expanding autonomy of SOEs in 1984 in which the contract responsibility policy 
was implemented to allow managers to share part of the profits of the enterprise. In 1988, the 
state-owned enterprise law was issued not only to clarify property rights, but also to separate 
the government from the enterprise management and to implement incentive contracts. 
However, these reforms could not reach their target because central planning still constrained 
the effectiveness of incentive contracts between the government and management and directly 
affected corporate governance through ownership and control (Lin, 2001; Qian, 1996).  
In particular, the result of enterprise reform reminded the policy makers and scholars that the 
effective exercise of ownership rights by the government involves a range of complex 
governance issues which limits the capacity for effective monitoring of enterprise assets 
(Jefferson & Rawski, 2002; Tam, 2000). Therefore, since 1993 the government has begun 
taking measures to establish a basic framework of corporate governance. 
Stage 2: 1993-1998 
At the end of 1993, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced its decision on various 
issues concerning the establishment of a Socialist Market Economic system. In this decision, 
the CCP called for the establishment of modern corporations as an important measure of 
enterprise reform and placed emphasis on the clarification of property rights in order to 
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transfer the SOEs into the legal entities in a way of corporatization. Specifically, some 
scholars and policy makers suggested that the government should establish financial 
intermediaries and holding companies to reorganize the relationship between the government 
and SOEs; others proposed that the government should adopted some forms of debt-equity 
swap between various classes of SOEs to solve problems of their bank loan repayments and to 
improve the profit performance (Tam, 2000). Especially in the early 1990s, the Chinese 
central government opened the stock exchange and allowed SOEs to issue some of the state 
shares to individual investors. As a result, these programmes promoted SOEs to speed up the 
reform of property rights and the establishment of a modern system of corporate governance.  
In addition, corporate law was introduced in this stage and clearly required the enterprises not 
only to hold an annual shareholder meeting, but also to maintain a board of directors and a 
supervisory board. Specifically, based on corporate law, board of directors and supervisory 
board are defined as a decision control unit and as a monitoring unit separately, and are 
appointed by and report to shareholders. That is, the board is responsible for appointing the 
top managers, organizing the shareholders meeting and implementing the resolutions of 
shareholders meeting and undertaking strategy decisions. At the same time, the law also 
described the responsibilities of the supervisory board which mainly included monitoring 
directors and managers to ensure compliance with the law and the articles of incorporation, 
and requesting directors and managers to alter their actions if they were in conflict with the 
enterprise‘s objectives. Therefore, the Chinese governance structure not only derives the 
benefit of the Germanic two-tier governance system, but also benefited from the advantages 
of the single-tier governance structure of the Anglo-American model. For instances, the 
advantage of a two-tier governance structure is that the board of supervisors has greater 
independence in relation to the executives. Its disadvantage is that the supervisory board lacks 
information to carry out its functions because it is far from the real business of the 
company.The advantage of a single-tier governance structure is that it has more information 
in relationship to the business of the company; its disadvantage is that it simply becomes a 
―rubber stamp‖, because it is easily manipulated internally in state-owned enterprises (Qian & 
Wu, 2003). 
In summary, SOEs have gradually been restructured to establish the basic framework of 
corporate governance based on the modern enterprise system with  
“Clarified property rights, clearly defined responsibility and authority, separation of 
enterprise from government, and scientific internal management” (p.2)  
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through corporatization and securitization (Wang, 2004). Furthermore, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of corporate governance, China‘s government has issued a series of regulation 
and principles to improve the corporate governance system since 1999. 
Stage 3: 1999- present 
The decision on the SOE reform issued by the Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth CPC 
Central Committee made a few breakthroughs in Chinese enterprise reform in 1999. For 
instance, the government announced three important new policies that had a profound effect 
on the development of China‘s corporate governance:  
1. The adjustment of the layout of the state economy to narrow its scope;  
2. The diversification of ownership structure for those enterprises over which the 
government still expected to maintain control; and 
3. The establishment of effective corporate governance according to international standards.  
In particular, government officials formally introduced the concept of corporate governance in 
1999. Furthermore, the third plenum of the Sixteenth Party Congress announced its decision 
of further perfecting the socialist market economy system to strengthen the reform in 2003. 
Based on these decisions, the government require the SOEs to further develop the separation 
of ownership and control in order to perfect the modern system of corporate governance.  
Therefore, corporate governance has gradually been regarded as an important component of 
enterprise reform that affects the firm performance in the state-owned enterprises and 
achieved significant developments over the past 30 years. For instance, according to a survey 
by Deloitte (2010), the reform of corporate governance in most surveyed Chinese firms was 
not just to meet the regulatory requirements, but to meet their company‘s long-term 
development needs including the need to raise capital, to protect shareholder rights and to 
improve decision making. Therefore, as Fan Fuchun (2002), vice chairman of China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), indicated: 
“High quality listed companies cannot be set apart from effective corporate 
governance. Practice experience shows that improving the corporate governance system is an 
integral part for raising the quality of listed companies. This also forms the micro-foundation 
for an effective operation of the entire capital market.” (p.12)  
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Meanwhile, Chinese government have also promulgated a large number of laws and 
regulations ,which included the Company Law of People‘s Republic of China (PRC) (revised 
in 2005), the Accounting Law of PRC (revised in1999), and the Securities Law of PRC 
(revised in 2005), to perfect the framework of Chinese corporate governance. Specifically, 
according to these laws, the government and government authorities concentrated on how to 
allocate responsibility and accountability between the shareholders, the directors and the 
managers, how to make the managers align with shareholders‘ interests, and how to design 
incentive mechanisms for managers in the firm. In addition, the Code of Corporate 
Governance of Chinese Listed Companies which aims to establish the basic principles for the 
corporate governance of China‘s listed companies was issued by the China securities 
regulatory commission (CSRC) in 2002. The Code not only specified the shareholders‘ rights, 
the role of the controlling shareholder and directors, but also further strengthened the 
information disclosure and transparency in Chinese listed companies. For instances there are 
some important requirements of corporate governance as follows: 
1. Controlling shareholders own a duty of good faith toward the listed company and other 
shareholder. Controlling shareholders should be prevented from damaging the listed 
companies‘ or other shareholders‘ legal rights and interests. 
2. A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such as aspects as 
personal assets, financial affairs, business and accounting. 
3. Directors shall faithfully, honestly and diligently perform their duties in the best interests 
of the company and all the shareholders. 
4. A listed company shall formulate rules of procedure for its boards to ensure the board‘s 
efficient functioning and rational decisions. 
To date, a number of Chinese listed companies have steadily developed a modern corporate 
governance system to act as an engine for effective policy making and appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms. In order to illustrate the system, a simple representation of the governance 
structure of Chinese listed companies is given in Figure 1.1 
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Figure 1.1 Corporate Governance Structure in Chinese Listed Firms.  
1.2 The difference between Chinese and western corporate governance model 
To summarize, China drew upon successful experience and mechanisms of western corporate 
governance and objectively improves the effectiveness of corporate governance practices. 
However, in order to comprehensively assess corporate governance, we should turn our 
attention to understand that institutional diffences give rise to governance arrangements that 
are suitable, not in a universal sense, but rather for the individual firm and the context in 
which it is situated, because an astute appreciation of corporate governance should recognize 
that the governance arrangement in an individual company is situated in a historical, social 
and organizational context that is particular to that company(D. C. Hambrick, Werder, & 
Zajac, 2008; Yoshikawa, Tsui-Auch, & McGuire, 2007). Therefore, based on the western 
theoretical concepts of corporate governance, China has some unique governance 
characteristics in reponse to its economic situation in the transition and emerging economy.   
Specifically, traditional agency theory as the dominant view of corporate governance 
emphasises the importance of agency relationship, which refer to ―contracts under which one 
or more principal(s) engages another the agent to perform some service on their behalf which 
involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent‖ (Jensen & Meckling, 
State-owned Assets supervision 
and Administration Commission 
of the State Council (SASAC) 
State authorised investment 
organizations  
 
9  
All other 
shareholders 
Shareholders‘ meeting 
Board of directors 
Supervisory board 
CEO 
Senior managers 
Audit 
committee 
Remuneration 
committee 
Nomination 
committee 
Supervising Ministries  
&Government 
authorized 
organizations 
Shares held by state-owned 
entities  
State-owned shares 
China Securities 
Regulatory 
Commission  
 9 
1976),and suggests relationship between shareholders and mangers is coordinated by the 
contract to determine rights of the managers and allocation of return within the firm. 
However, in the transition and emerging econmy of China,  the ultimate control of the listed 
companies still remain in the hands of China Communist Party (CCP) and the government, 
therefore, although Chinese government has replicate a set of western governance 
mechanisms to ensure that the shareholders can get an adequante reture on their investement, 
application of the agency theory must incorporate considerations of political interference on 
corporate governance as well, because reducing the political costs is precisely the reason for 
expanding enterprise autonomy in the first place (Qian, 1996). 
Furthermore, critiques of agency theory lead to variation in the corporate governance structure 
between China and western countries. Firstly, corporate governance with Chinese 
characteristics has been developed in the process of the reform of State-owned enterprises, 
therefore, the main differences are the government or state asset management agencies 
retaining a large percent of share of listed companies and still maintaining the ultimate control 
rights in Chinese listed firms. That is, Chinese firms are chacraterized by dominant 
shareholder (government or government authorized organizations) whose stockholding far 
exceed the second largest stockholder. For example, some scholars found that the single 
largest owner holds 36% of an average company‘s shares, the biggest five owners held 52% 
of the total shares in Chinese listed companies (Liang & Useem, 2009). Second, because the 
CCP and government playing a leading role in the development of corporate governance 
framework, the selection and appointment process of directors and CEO is different from the 
western countries. That is, the appointement, evaluation and dismissal of directors and CEO 
are always made by the China communist party, central government and local government in 
Chinese listed companies. Finally, the political-determined governance model which results 
from Chinese traditional planned economic system creates a multiple-tier governance control 
line between principals and agents. Within this governance control line, the state-owned 
supervision commission is the representative agent of the state property and acts as the high-
level government authority to supervise the operation of state-controlled corporations. In 
addition, there also exists the central or local government and government–controlled 
intermediaries between the commission and the state-owned listed companies. Therefore, the 
complicated line cannot show a direct and clear linkage between principal and agents and may 
hurt the effectiveness of corporate governance in Chinese list companies. 
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Table 1.1 summarizes the key difference between Chinese and western corporate governance 
from the perspectives of internal mechanism, external mechanism and governance 
environment as follows: 
Table 1.1   Key Differences between the Chinese and Western Corporate Governance  
                  Model 
                         
 
 Western corporate 
governance model (U.K. and 
U.S. model) 
China’s corporate governance 
model 
Internal mechanisms   
Ownership structure Dispersed ownership   Concentrated ownership 
Shareholder type 
Institutional investors 
(investment companies and 
pension funds) 
Government and government 
authorized organizations 
Board structure  
Single tier board (board of 
directors).  
Two-tier board (board of 
directors and supervisory 
board). The appointment and 
evaluation of directors are made 
by CCP and governments. 
Independent directors 
Professional experts (lawyer, 
accountant and academic 
scholars) 
Appointed by state controlling 
shareholders 
CEO duality  
Separation of CEO and 
chairman  
Both CEO and chairman are 
appointed by CCP and 
government  
Compensation level 
and arrangements  
The compensation is tied to firm 
performance  
The compensation is not related 
with firm performance 
External 
mechanisms 
  
Legal System 
Good legal framework and 
enforcement;  
Sufficient shareholder 
protection   
Weak legal system; insufficient 
protection of property rights  
Corporate control 
market  
Efficient capital market  
(mergers and takeovers; 
adequate transparency)  
Immature capital market 
Governance 
environment  
  
 
Economic regime  
Capitalist societies;  Market 
Economy 
Government-dominated 
economy; Socialist  market 
economy with Chinese 
characteristics  
Governance culture Individualism; democratic 
politics 
Collectivism and Guanxi 
(relationship); bureaucracy 
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In conclusion , the reform of corporate governance in China still confronted a dichotomy: is 
the government the critical reform actor or will the market serve as the central venue for 
restructuring (Jefferson & Rawski, 2002)? Thus, there appeared to be some features in the 
reform process of corporate governance. Firstly, the reform and state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) mainly focus on the interaction relationship between the government, the enterprise 
and market. Secondly, the most important part of the reform is the separation of government 
and enterprise. Thirdly, the essential problem of the separation of government and enterprise 
is the separation of ownership and control in the SOEs; fourthly, while separating ownership 
from control, the SOEs should establish a good structure of corporate governance to protect 
the interests of the state-owned property right of the SOEs. Finally, the SOEs should design 
optimal incentive contracts that can encourage the executives to maximize the interests of 
state-owned property rights. 
1.3 Problem Statements  
During 30 years of economic reform, Chinese companies have gradually made some 
important breakthroughs to establish modern corporate governance. However, listed 
companies‘ poor corporate governance is still a bottleneck in the development of the capital 
market. For example, the CLSA report rated China‘s governance practices ninth among 11 
Asian nations. Therefore, as Laura Cha(2002), the former Vice Chairman of the China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC), indicated, the concept of corporate governance 
has not been well developed or understood in China because China is in the transitional stage 
from a planned economy to a market economy.  
Furthermore, some scholars argued that poor corporate governance is still widespread among 
Chinese listed companies. For instance, the listed company, SanJiu Medical and 
Pharmaceutical Co. misappropriated US$301.9 million, which amounted to 96% of the 
company‘s net assets. Similarly, the GuangXia Industry Co. was investigated by the CSRC 
because it fabricated its financial report, earning the dubious label of the ―Chinese Enron‖. 
Therefore, scholars and practitioners have re-examined the limitations of the current 
governance system and further explored research on the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance from a broad perspective.  
Zhou (2004) (Governor of the People‘s Bank of China) summarized the current problems of 
corporate governance in China and raised some important issues in corporate governance 
development, such as the role of government in promoting corporate governance, the 
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selection of the corporate governance model, the problem of insider control and ownership 
ambiguity, the role of the party committee in corporate governance, the protection of 
stockholders‘ interests and the role of independent directors in corporate governance.  
Therefore, as discussed above, despite the reform of  Chinese corporate governance that has 
borrowed a number of concepts and ―best practices‖ from western developed countries and 
achieved some progress in corporate governance (e.g., listed firms have built boards of 
directors that are responsible for running the organization; and boards are required to have 
independent directors to keep their independence (G. Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006)), the 
main challenge for Chinese companies is still that companies should further develop a good 
governance system to better respond to the needs of company development. 
 Furthermore, as Tam (1999) indicated, the measures that improve the function and 
effectiveness of the corporate governance across different countries are premised in certain 
economic, commercial and social norms and conditions, and are the product of market 
interactions and regulatory responses, therefore,the arrangement of corporate governance in 
China should be situated in Chinese historical, social and organization context. 
To summarize the discussion above, the first problem in this study is described as follow: 
whether or not there is a positive relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance in Chinese listed companies? That is, this research attempts to analyse whether 
the the corporate governance model of western countries can apply fully in the emerging and 
transitional economy of China. Specifically, the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance is not only indicated that the firm with good corporate governance will 
receive higher firm performance, but also defined that the firm with better firm performance 
may choose to adopt the better framework of corporate governance. 
In addition, scholars also use financial statement presentation as a mechanism to assist users 
in better identify and understanding the firm performance, because the financial performance 
is not only an analytical tool to indentify strengths and weakness within the company, but also 
an important monitoring device to uncover a potential problems in firm operations. Therefore, 
this thesis used ROE and profit margin which are adopted and applied as importance factors 
to assess the executives‘ performance by the Chinese government or government authorized 
organization as proxies for firm performance, and attempts to measure the differenence in 
firm perform affected by corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. Specifically, I 
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measure the ROE by using net income divided by the average of owners‘equity; meanwhile, 
profit margin is measured by using net profit divided by revenue.  
Although a number of scholars (B. Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990b; A. A. Berle, Means, 
Weidenbaum, & Jensen, 1991; OECD, 2004) found that corporate governance has a strong 
impact on firm performance, these previous studies mainly focused on the governance 
structure in a corporate governance system and overlook the importance of the board process  
between corporate governance structure and firm performance, because the board interactive 
processes (such as cognitive conflicts, effort norms and use of skills and knowledge) build the 
linkage between corporate governance structure and firm performance, that is, governance 
structure diversity should lead to differential effectiveness and efficiency of interaction of 
board process, and then have different impacts on firm performance.  
Meanwhile, upper echelon theorists (M. A. Carpenter, M. A. Geletkanycz, & W. G. Sanders, 
2004a; D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984) have also found that the directors‘ demographic 
characteristics, acting as proxies for their cognition, value and perception, can also influence 
the  strategic choices and then have a strong impact on the effectiveness of interaction process 
of the board. Specifically, upper echelon theorists posited that organizational outcomes will 
be affected by the effectiveness of interaction process within top management team ,which is 
determined by the cognitive bias and values of top managers, on the other hand, they used 
managerial demographic characteristics as proxies of the cognition and value and provided a 
detailed explanation about the effect of  demographic heterogeneity of the top management 
team on firm performance, because the cognition and value cannot be measured directly and 
may be predicted by managerial demographic characteristics such as age, functional track, 
and tenure.Furthermore, the directors act as supra-top management team and play important 
roles in shaping the corporate strategy due to their apex position in the corporate pyramid. 
Therefore, directors‘ demographic characteristics will reflect different cognition and value 
and then have a strong impact on the interaction among the members of board and then on the 
relationship between corporate governance structure and firm performance.  
In summary, demographic heterogeneity of  members of board will moderate the relationship 
between corporate governance and  firm performance, as Cyert and March (1965) described 
as follows 
“What characterized authoritative decision makers under different conditions? How 
do their experience and reference group identifications affect their decisions? How are 
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executive expectations determined? What differences are there between individual and group 
decision making? How do hierarchical making in business companies, in what respect does 
this affect the content of the decisions?” (pp. 20-21). 
Thus, this study integrates directors‘ demographic characteristics into the conventional 
corporate governance framework and examines the moderating effect of these intervening 
variables upon the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
To summarize, this study developed an integrated framework which not only enabled 
evaluation of the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, but also 
examined the moderating effect of directors‘ demographic characteristics. That is, I proposed 
that demographic characteristics can be regarded as intervening variables to influence the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. As a result, this study 
opens a new avenue and provides new policy implications for corporate governance research 
from a wide-ranging persdpective. 
Starting from the first question, the research will further examine whether the demographic 
characteristics of directors can moderate the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance in Chinese listed companies.   
1.4 Thesis Organization  
The rest of the thesis is divided into five chapters. As discussed above, the thesis focuses on 
not only the relationship between corporate governance and firm performancein Chinese 
listed companies, but also the moderating impact of the demographic characteristics of 
directors on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Thus 
Chapter Two summarises a literature review about corporate governance and the demographic 
characteristics of directors. That is, the review first discusses the definitions and theoretical 
bases of corporate governance from different perspectives. Secondly, this chapter discusses 
the linkage between corporate governance structure and firm performance. Thirdly, upper 
echelon theory is introduced to explain the impact of the demographic characteristics of 
directors on firm performance. Finally, the chapter integrates the directors‘ demographic 
characteristics into the corporate governance system and encourages us to understand 
corporate governance from a comprehensive theoretical perspective. 
Building on the literature review, Chapter Three develops the hypotheses concerning the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance and then the interaction of 
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directors‘ demographic characteristics and corporate governance on the firm performance. 
Specifically, the chapter begins building a corporate governance index to examine the 
empirical relationship between corporate governance and firm performance from ownership 
and board perspectives, then, the argument concerns the moderating role of the demographic 
characteristics of the directors to hypothesize the interaction effects of corporate governance 
and directors‘ characteristics on the firm performance. Chapter Four discusses the 
methodology and the sample selection, definition of variables and statistical analysis 
techniques.Chapter Five reports the empirical results and highlights the findings. The thesis 
concludes with Chapter Six, which discusses the results, conclusions, limitations and future 
research directions. 
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     Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first provides the definitions of corporate 
governance. The second section discusses the theoretical base of corporate governance from 
different perspectives including agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and 
resource dependence theory. In the third section, the review discusses corporate governance 
structure, such as ownership structure and board structure. The fourth section describes the 
link between corporate governance structure and firm performance. In the fifth section, I 
introduce upper echelon theory and explain the effect of demographic characteristics of the 
top management team on strategic choice and firm outcomes. In the final section, the review 
summarizes the prior discussions and posits an integrated research model, which indicates the 
moderating impact of the directors‘ demographic characteristics on the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. 
2.1 Definitions of Corporate Governance  
The fundamental insight on corporate governance can be traced back to Adam Smith. He (A. 
Smith, 1776) emphasized in his Wealth of Nations that:  
“Being the managers of other people‟s money than of their own, it cannot well be 
expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which partners 
in a private co-partner frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they 
consider attention to small matters as not for their master‟s honour and very easily give 
themselves a dispensation from having it.” 
Furthermore, according to Berle and Means‘s (1932) article on the separation of ownership 
and control, the objective of managers can not completely go along with those of owners, 
because of managerial self-interest and information asymmetries in the corporation. 
Therefore, the core problem of corporate governance is that the objectives of company 
managers often conflict with those of the shareholders who own the company (Jensen, 2000). 
Conventional corporate governance introduces a set of internal and external mechanisms that 
induce self-interested agents to maximize the value of the residual cash flow of the 
organization on behalf of the principals.  
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However, the failures of corporate governance lead scholars to further investigate the topic of 
corporate governance from a wide range of academic fields, as a result, researchers and 
practitioners have provided a large number of valuable insights into many aspects of corporate 
governance, and have different definitions of corporate governance from diverse theoretical 
perspectives. From conventional governance conceptual perspectives, some scholars 
demonstrated that the emphasis on corporate governance is the efficacy of the various 
mechanisms available to protect shareholders from the self-interested whims of executives, 
and agree that good corporate governance should explore the complementarities of 
institutional arrangements to reduce total agency costs (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Gillan& 
Starks, 2000).  
In addition, Monks and Minow (2004) defined corporate governance as the relationship 
among various participants (including:chief executive officer, management, shareholders, 
employees) in determining the direction and performance of corporations, similarly Blair 
(1995) defined corporate governance as follows: 
“The whole set of legal, cultural and institutional arrangements that determine what a 
publicly-traded corporation can do, who control them, how that control is exercised, and how 
the risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated.” (p. 3) 
From systemic perspective, The OECD (2004) indicated the objectives, instruments and 
transmission mechanisms of corporate governance,which has become a useful and widely 
acceptable definition : 
“Corporate governance involves a set of relationships between a company‟s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholder,corporate governance also 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined. Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to pursue 
objectives that are in the interests of the company and its shareholders and should facilitate 
effective monitoring.” (p. 11)    
In 2008, Hambrick, Werder and Zajac (2008) suggested the new direction in corproate 
governance research and defined corporate governance as the structure and process by which 
an organization‘s assets and activities are overseen. Specifically, they emphasised that 
scholars should consider corporate governance along a micro dimension (from the 
organization inward) and a macro dimension (from organization outward) and then analyze 
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corporate governance from three different perspectives: formal structure, behaviour structure 
and behaviour process. They also indicated that not only do the constituents of firms stand to 
gain or lose, depending on the quality and nature of corporate governance, but entire national 
systems can be propelled or stymied as well. 
In summary, Gillan et al. provided the balance sheet model of the firm to capture the essence 
of corporate governance. The left side is composed mainly of the basics of internal 
governance including boards of directors, management and the financial structure. The right 
side comprises the elements of external governance arising from the firm‘s need to raise 
capital. Therefore, the model addresses the detail relationship between capital provider and 
those who manage the capital. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                    
               Source: Recent development in corporate governance(Gillan, 2006)   
  Figure 2.1 Corporate governance model 
In China, Qian (1996) defined corporate governance as a set of institutional arrangements that 
govern the relationship among several groups of stakeholders (investors [shareholders and 
creditors], managers and workers). Specifically, he proposed that scholars and practitioners 
should be concerned with three aspects of the structure of corporate governance:  
1. How control rights are allocated and exercised;  
2. How the directors and top managers are selected and monitored; and  
3. How the incentives are designed and enforced.  
In brief, the major issues of corporate governance focus on how to limit agency problems, 
protect shareholder and creditors, and also provide room for managerial initiatives. Li Wei-An 
(2008) also systematically defined corporate governance as the principal-agent relationship 
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between shareholders and the board of directors, and board of directors and the top managers. 
Further, he also indicated that a power check and balance system is necessary to monitor the 
behaviour of agents as well as to force them to make the effort for the realization of the 
principle‘s maximum interests. In addition, Wu Jinglian (1994) provided the definition of 
corporate governance from the organization structure perspective, which is accepted by most 
Chinese scholars: 
“The organizational structure consisting of the owners, board of directors and senior 
managers, a check and balance relationship is formed within that structure, through 
which the owner entrusts its capital to the board of directors, the board of directors is 
the highest level of decision making of the company and has the power to appoint, 
reward and penalise, and dismiss senior managers.” (p. 185) 
To summarized the discussions above , corporate governance has attracted lots of attention of 
scholars and practitioners in a wide array of fields that include accounting, finance, 
management, economic and social science. therefore, as some scholars indicate (D. C. 
Hambrick et al., 2008), the useful insights about corporate governance must have a broder 
scope, encomposing such complex mattes as multiple stakeholder, board dynamics, 
managerial values and motives and national system.  
2.2 Theory of Corporate Governance 
2.2.1 Agency Theory  
Agency theory remains the dominant theory of corporate governance, and owes its 
development to research conducted by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) and Jensen and Meckling 
(1976). Specifically, compared with classical economics, the theory considers the company as 
a productive function and coordinated operation through the exchange transactions in the 
market, and explains the production of the firm through a continually negotiated contract 
among an aggregation of individuals whose aims are to maximize their own utility 
(Learmount, 2002). Therefore, agency theory gives unique insights into information systems, 
outcomes uncertainty, incentives and risk (Eisenhardt, 1989) and is highly prevalent in the 
theoretical understanding of corporate governance.  
The core of agency theory is the agency relationship, which refer to ―contracts under which 
one or more principal(s) engages another the agent to perform some service on their behalf 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent‖ (Jensen & Meckling, 
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1976). Specifically, the shareholders invest funds for productive use and then engage the 
managers to generate return on the funds in the company. Thus, the relationship between 
shareholders and mangers is coordinated by the contract to determine rights of the managers 
and allocation of return within the firm.  
The essence of agency theory rests upon resolving two problems which arise from agency 
relationships. The first is the agency problem arising when (a) the goals of the principal and 
agent conflict; and (b) it is difficult for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. 
The second problem is the risk sharing which derives from different attitudes toward risk 
between principals and agents, and causes the principals and agents to prefer different actions 
because of different risk preferences. (T. Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998a; Eisenhardt, 
1989). Therefore, agency costs will be generated when the principals encourage managers to 
maximize the principals‘ wealth rather than act in the managers‘ own self-interests. 
Specifically, the principal can establish incentives mechanisms to limit aberrant activities by 
incurring monitoring costs. Meanwhile, agents will also incur bonding costs to guarantee that 
they will not take action harming the interests of the principals. The divergence of the 
decision between agents and principals cause reduction in the wealth of the principals, which 
is regarded as a residual loss. As a result, the sum of the principals‘ monitoring expenditure, 
the agents‘ bonding expenditure and the residual loss is defined as the agency cost (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Therefore, agency theory focuses on how the principals can design 
incentives and monitoring mechanisms to influence the agents‘ behaviour as well as minimize 
the agency costs. According to Eisenhardt (1989), 
“Overall, the domain of agency theory is the relationships that mirror the basic 
agency structure of a principal and an agent who are engaged in corporative behaviour, but 
have differing goals and attitudes toward risk”(p.59). 
In China, based on agency theory, the fundamental problems of Chinese corporate governance 
are also identifiable as management incentives and management monitoring due to 
information asymmetry and the incompleteness of the contracts. However, the ultimate 
control rights of the selection and dismissal of top managers remained in the hands of the 
government, therefore, understanding this interaction between the effective control by 
managers and the ultimate control by the government is the key to exploring the problems of 
corporate governance (Qian, 1994). Furthermore, some scholars (Qian, 1994; L. C. Xu, Zhu, 
& Lin, 2005) argue that political control can cause not only higher political cost, but also 
inefficient interference in management to increase agency costs. Thus they expect that 
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political costs can be reduced by separating government from enterprises and that agency 
costs can be mitigated by introducing non-government institutional shareholders and private 
shareholders. In summary, the application of the agency theory in China should also include 
consideration of political costs and government political interference (Chang & Wong, 2004; 
Qian, 1996).  
2.2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
The philosophical antecedents of stakeholder theory can be dated back to the concepts of the 
co-operative movement, mutuality and the intellectual foundations which describe company 
as a bundle of human assets and relationships (Clarke, 1984, 1991; Penrose, 1959). 
Nowadays, stakeholder theory owes its development to Freeman‘s seminal text Strategic 
Management: a Stakeholder Approach (Freeman, 1984). Freeman‘s study not only defined 
the concept of stakeholder, but also provided the explanation that a corporation takes 
responsibilities for its stakeholders. Therefore, Freeman‘s research presented a solid 
foundation for the definition and construction of stakeholder models, frameworks and theories 
(Clarkson, 1995). To date, a number of studies have highlighted the concept of stakeholders. 
The idea of stakeholders of the corporation has now become commonplace in the 
management literature, including academics and practitioners (T. Donaldson & Preston, 
1995). 
Specifically, based on the definition by Freeman (1984), the stakeholder is discripted as  
“Any group or individual can affect, or is affected by, the achievement of a 
corporation‟s purpose. Stakeholders include employees, customers, suppliers, 
stockholders, banks, environmentalists, government and other groups who can help or 
hurt the corporation.‖(p.46)  
Clarkson (1995) not only gave a definition of stakeholders, but also classified them into 
primary and secondary stakeholders in terms of similar interests, claims and rights. The 
primary stakeholder group is necessary for the corporation to survive as a going concern and 
includes the shareholders, investors, employees, customers, suppliers and public stakeholder 
groups. The secondary stakeholder group is defined as those who affect or are affected by the 
corporation. This group is essential for the survival of the corporation. In summary, both 
groups can be seen as providing the company with critical resources (contributions) and, in 
exchange, each group expects its interests to be satisfied by the companies (Hill & Jones, 
1992). 
 22 
The essence of stakeholder theory assumes that  
“the firm as a system of stakeholders operating within the larger system of the host 
society that provides the necessary legal and market infrastructure for the companies‟ 
activities, the purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stakeholders by 
converting their stakes into goods and services” (Clarkson, 1994, p. 19).  
Therefore, stakeholder theory involves three aspects that attempt to explain and guide the 
structure and operation of the corporation based on different methodologies, types of evidence 
and criteria of appraisal. The descriptive aspect is used to describe the specific characteristics 
and behaviour of the corporation. The instrumental aspect is applied to identify the 
connections between stakeholders, management and the achievement of traditional corporate 
objectives. The normative aspect focuses on the interpretation of the function of the 
corporation, including the identification of moral guidelines for the operation and 
management of the corporation (T. Donaldson & Preston, 1995).  
In China, stakeholder theory has attracted more attention among scholars and policy makers. 
For instances, Li (2002) indicated that corporate governance should comprise a series of 
formal and informal institutions to coordinate the association among the 
stakeholders(including: shareholders, managers, employees, suppliers, government and 
communities). As a result, firms can enhance decision making to protect the interests of 
stakeholders. In addition, some scholars also discussed applying stakeholder theory from 
different perspectives. In addition, Li (2001) suggested that the stakeholders in corporate 
governance can maintain the continuity and stability in a firm‘s development. Yang (2001) 
emphasized that the protection of stakeholders‘ interests can improve the stability in the 
employee team and the relationship among the shareholders, managements and employees.  
Furthermore, some scholars and policymakers proposed that China should follow the 
stakeholder theory framework to construct mechanisms for corporate governance. For 
instance, Yang and Zhou (2000) found that the firm should focus on the impact of 
stakeholders (such as shareholders, creditor, suppliers, customers and employees ) on 
monitoring managers, because political interference has negatively impacted the effectiveness 
of boards in China. In addition, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued a series of regulations and policies to 
enhance the compostion of board of directors and posited that the members of boards should 
contain the employee directors in order to protect the interests of the employees. 
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2.2.3  Stewardship Theory 
Unlike agency theory which considers managers as opportunistic shirkers, stewardship theory 
defines the relationship between principal and agent based on other behavioural premises. 
Specifically, stewardship theory defines situations in which managers are not motivated by 
individual goals, but rather are stewards whose motives are aligned with the objectives of 
their principals (David et al., 1997). As Donaldson (1997) indicated, given the potential 
multiplicity of shareholders‘ objectives, a steward‘s behaviour can be considered 
organizationally centred; that is, the steward in the organization should be motivated to make 
decisions that are in the best interests of the group and then the principals have interests that 
are well served by increasing organizational wealth. Simply, a pro-organizational steward is 
motivated to maximize organizational performance, thereby satisfying the competing interests 
of the shareholders. 
On the other hand, the steward also realizes the balance between personal needs and 
organizational objectives and considers that personal needs are met through working towards 
organizational, collective ends. As Donaldson (1991) emphasized: 
“The steward‟s opportunity set is constrained by the perception that the utility gained 
from pro-organizational behaviour is higher than the utility that can be gained through 
individualistic, self-serving behaviour. Stewards believe their interests are aligned with that 
of the corporation and its owners. Thus, the steward‟s interests and utility motivations are 
directed to organizational rather than personal objectives.” (p. 56) 
In China, some scholars have applied stewardship theory to explain the relationship between 
board and managers from the perspectives of social and psychological dynamics.  (Fang & 
Guangjun, 2008; Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Zhiyue & Shinong, 2007). Specifically, they 
indicated that the close social ties between directors and managers has a positive effect on the 
firm performance in terms of stewardship theory, because economic transactions in China are 
influenced more by social relationships such as common work experience and personal 
relationships rather than a formal contract. For example, common work experiences can 
promote the directors and managers to establish a comfortable communication pattern and 
reach an understanding about the firm‘s condition. In addition , in Chinese firms, the CEO 
will consider the CEO duality as a reputation and protect it through good job performance 
(Tam, 1999; Tian & Lau, 2001). In summary, as Zhang (2008) suggested, state-owned 
enterprises should focus not only on the supervision for managers but also cooperation with 
them in order to improve firm performance.  
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2.2.4 Resource Dependence Theory   
Resource dependence theory is organization theory that explains that an organization must 
have certain resources in order to survive and function. Hence, this theory suggests that a 
given organization will respond to and become dependent on those organizations or entities 
that control the resources which are critical to its operations in its environment (Casciaro, 
2005). 
In corporate governance, resource dependence theory provides an analytic foundation for the 
role of the board of directors. For instances, board size is a measure of an organization‘s 
ability to form environmental links with critical resources in order to secure the success of the 
organization. Because, as some scholars indicate, the firm can increase the board size to  
improve its ability to extract critical resources which include external funding and leverage 
from its environment , and to deal with environmental uncertainty which is cause by the 
asymmetry of information and volatility. Alternatively, outside directors can also provide 
access to resources for the improvement of firm performance. For instances, an outside 
director from a financial institution can facilitate the company in securing lines of credit, 
likewise, the outside directors from law firms can provide the suggestions to effectively 
protect company assets (Boyd, 1990; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003).  
In the Chinese case, some scholars have discussed the effect of corporate governance 
mechanisms on the firm‘s outcomes based on resource dependence theory. For example, Peng 
et al. (2003) proposed that the resource dependence function is more pronounced for Chinese 
boards than in developed countries because of the Chinese cultural propensity of depending 
on the relationship (Guanxi) to get things done. Other scholars (Keister, 2000; Park & Luo, 
2001) also found that managerial networks such as board interlocks have a positive effect on 
the firm performancein Chinese firms.  
2.2.5 Concluding Remarks 
The literature review has discussed the theoretical bases of corporate governance from a wide 
range of different and competing perspectives. Agency theory is still the dominant theoretical 
paradigm of corporate governance and it influences organization structure and business 
policy. However, as Daily, Dalton and Cannel (2003) indicated, other theoretical perspectives 
can be regarded as important complements to agency theory, that is, multi-theoretical 
approaches are essential to perfect the corporate governance. 
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2.3 Corporate Governance Structure 
The separation of ownership and control leads to potential conflicts of interest between 
shareholders and manager. Corporate governance structure acts as a mechanism available to 
protect shareholders from the self-interest of executives and assures alignment of the interests 
of managers with those of shareholder (A. Berle & Means, 1932; Hart, 1995b). Furthermore, 
the ownership structure and the board structure are considered as the central control 
mechanisms for monitoring the behaviour of managers and have currently been the important 
debated issues in corporate governance. 
However, as some scholars (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001; Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003) 
indicate, there exists different types of ownership structure and board structure across firms 
because corporate governance stuctures are endogenously determined by trade-offs between 
the monitoring costs and benefits of effective monitoring for different firms. Furthermore, as 
Shieifer and Vishny (1997a) argued, most available research on corporate governance comes 
from the western developed countries, and at the time of their writing there was little research 
on corporate governance in developing countries, although this position is changing. 
Therefore the following will discuss not only the development of corporate governance 
structures in western countries, but also the characteristics of corporate governance structures 
in the transition and emerging economy of China. 
2.3.1 Ownership Structure  
A well–designed ownership structure is an important approach to influence the operating 
strategy and then improve the firm‘s value. Some academics have found that ownership 
concentration has a positive impact on firm performance because the concentrated ownership 
can counter the agency problem in countries with a low level of investor protection (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997a). For example, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) explained that concentrated ownership in the firm can mitigate 
free-rider problems where the ownership has been dispersed because the small owners may 
not pay attention to monitoring the performance of the management in a corporate with a 
large number of minority shareholders. Similarly,Grossman and Hart (1980)  explained that, 
if the ownership is widely dispersed in the company, shareholders will have not adequate 
incentives to devote resources to supervise the management team, furthermore, empirical 
studies have also reported that there is a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance(Agrawal & Mandelker, 2009; Huddart, 1993).  
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However, other scholars (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Holderness, 2005) indicate that 
concentrated ownership has no significant impact on firm performance, because large 
shareholders have a large enough stake to make use of resources to advance their interests at 
the expense of other minority shareholders; that is, concentrated ownership may transfer 
resources out of companies for the benefit of controlling shareholders. For instance, Cho 
(1998) and Short (1994) found that there was no systematic relationship between ownership 
structure and firm outcome based on the empirical results. 
China has unique ownership characteristics compared with western countries. Specifically, 
the shares are divideded into state-owned, legal entity and individual shares in terms of 
China‘s company law. The state-owned shares are held directly by central government, local 
government and/or their associated ministries; legal entity shares are owned by state-owned 
enterprises or non state-owned enterprises; and individual shares are held by the natural 
persons.  
Furthermore, scholars also draw attention to two different dimensions of ownership structure 
in Chinese listed firms compared with those in the western countries: 
1. The ownership of Chinese listed companies is highly concentrated, e.g., the single largest 
owner holds 36% of an average company‘s shares, the biggest five owners held 52% 
(Liang & Useem, 2009).  
2. The ultimate control rights in Chinese listed firms are maintained by the government or 
state asset management agencies because the state-owned shareholders‘ stockholding far 
exceeds the other stockholders in Chinese listed firms. More specifically, as shown in 
Table 2.1, the top two shareholders usually hold nearly two-thirds of the total shares in 
their company. Therefore, the political control has a strong impact on the effectiveness of 
corporate governance in Chinese listed companies. 
On the other hand, some Chinese scholars (Z. Bai, 2002; Y. Zhang, 2002) suggested that the 
Berle and Means‘ model of dispersed ownership should be the ideal for corporate governance 
and believe that big shareholders often manipulate most of the business operation in the 
companies and lead to internal personal control. Therefore they argue that a dominant single 
shareholder with a large amount of shares is a serious problem in Chinese companies.  
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Table 2.1 Ownership Strucure of Chinese Enterprises 
Name of Bank 
Name of 
Shareholder 
Percentage of Total 
Shares (%) 
Nature of Shares 
ICBC 
Central Huijin 35.41 State-Owned Shares 
MOF 35.33 State-Owned Shares 
CCB 
Central Huijin 48.17 State-Owned Shares 
Bank of America 19.13 Foreign Legal Person 
BOC 
Central SAFE 67.52 State-Owned Shares 
HKSCC 12.24 Foreign Legal Persons 
RBS China 8.25 Foreign Legal Persons 
ABC 
MOF 39.12 State-owned shares 
Central Huijin 40.03 State-owned shares 
Sources: ICBC‘s Annual Report (2008), CCB‘s Annual Report (2008)  
               BOC‘s Annual Report (2008), ABC‘s Annual Report (2008)   
 
2.3.2 Board Structure 
Board of directors plays an important role in corporate governance and is responsible for 
monitoring and advising managers on behalf of shareholders, that is, the board of directors is 
the significant instrument through which shareholders can affect the behaviour of managers, 
and make the company‘s interests align with shareholders‘ value. Therefore, a good board not 
only can inspect the managers‘harmful behaviour through its monitoring function , but also 
can help management make good decisions through its advising function (Adams & Ferreira, 
2007; Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008; Raheja, 2009). Specifically, the research on board 
structure concentrates on three aspects: board size, board composition and board leadership 
structure. Board size is the number of directors on the board; board composition refers to the 
proportion of the independent directors on the board; and the board leadership structure is 
whether the CEO is also the chairperson of the board. 
2.3.2.1 Board size 
Board size has been studied extensively by the scholars and policymakers, because the 
number of directors on the board can affect the effectiveness of board functioning and thus 
corporate performance, however, there are different views on the impact of board size on firm 
performance. Specifically, some scholars have found that smaller boards are more effective 
than larger boards. For example, Yermack (1995) found that there is a negative relationship 
between Tobin‘s Q and board size. Similarly, Eisenberg (1998a) indicated that smaller boards 
are linked to higher firm value because smaller boards are more cohesive, more productive 
and can monitor the firm effectively. Furthermore, scholars also note that larger boards are 
not good monitors because of social loafing and higher co-ordination costs (Jensen, 1994; 
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Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). In addition, Cheng (2008)  found that larger boards can lead to lower 
variability of firm performance.  
Conversely, other scholars argue that there is a positive relationship between larger boards 
and firm performance because they not only offer better advices for strategic decisions, but 
also reduce the negative effect of CEO domination. For example, Dalton, Daily, Johnson and 
Ellstrand (1999) argued that in larger boards, directors can provide oversight over managerial 
decisions and activities. Similarly, Agrawal and Knoeber (2009) noted that larger boards can 
bring broad experience and expertise to meet the firm‘s needs.  
2.3.2.2  Board composition 
The central point of studies of board composition is the proportion of independent directors in 
the boardroom. Because independent directors are the members of boards who are not 
employed by or engaged with the firm, and have no disqualifying relationship with the 
company (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008), the board should have a majority of independent 
directors in order to prevent the firm from being dominated by the firm‘s managers (Conyon, 
2008; Fama & Jensen, 1983b; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993). Scholars and policy makers 
have provided evidence to support this perspective. For example, Baysinger and Bulter 
(1985b) found that firms with a higher proportion of independent directors led to superior 
performance. In addition, Bozes and Dia (2007) analysized the relationship between the board 
composition and company performance in 14 Canadian SOEs, and found that the SOEs with a 
larger proportion of independent directors on their board had a positive impact on firm 
performance compared with SOEs with a small proportion of  independent directors.  
However, other scholars held different views on the effect of independent director ratio on 
firm performance. for instance, Bhagat and Black (2007) studied the relationship between 
board composition and company performance—Tobin Q, ROA, Sales/Assets, and long-term 
stock returns based on 828 American companies in 1991,and found that, although a company 
with poor performance has a tendency to appoint more independent directors, more 
independent directors on corporate boards would not improve the corporate governance 
andcannot lead to improved performance. Therefore, the findings on the relationship between 
the board composition and firm performance are mixed. 
2.3.2.3 Board leadership structure 
Another important factor for effectiveness of the board of directors is CEO duality which 
refers to one person serving both as a company‘s CEO and board chairman. Can CEO duality 
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influence the performance of the firm? According to agency theory, researchers suggest that 
separation of the CEO and the chairman of the board can facilitate more effective monitoring 
and control of the CEO because other directors cannot easily assess the performance of the 
CEO of the firm, when the CEO also serves as chairman of the board (Fama & Jensen, 1983b, 
1983c; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994). Furthermore, Jenson (1994) indicated that it is difficult 
for the board to effectively perform its critical function without the direction of an 
independent leader. Macavoy and Millstein (2004) also emphasized that the failure of 
independent board leadership gave rise to challenges in connection with directors ‗duty of 
good faith‘.  
Conversely, other scholars provided support for CEO duality. For instance, they argued that 
CEO duality can facilitate decision making because CEO duality can create a clear line of 
authority and responsibility in the firm (J. Galbraith, 1977; Massie, 1965). Similarly, scholars 
found that non-duality can disrupt the CEO‘s ability to adapt to the environment and make it 
difficult for the firm to take any decisive actions (Mintzberg & Waters, 1990). From a 
practical perspective, the findings of some empirical papers also support the views on the 
benefits of CEO duality. For instance, Faleye (2007) suggested that requiring all firms to 
separate the CEO and chairman duties may be counterproductive and could not produce the 
desired results. Dahya et al. (2009) found that companies splitting combined CEO/chairman 
positions did not show any absolute improvement in performance compared with various 
peer-group benchmarks. Briefly, previous studies have not reached a consensus on whether a 
firm should adopt the CEO duality in the boardroom or not. 
2.3.2.4 Board structure in China 
The corporate governance reform in Chinese companies learned from the successful  
experience of the board structure in the western corporate governance model and aimed to 
design the structure of the board with Chinese characteristics to improve the effectiveness of 
corporate governance (Xiao, Dahya, & Lin, 2004). Thus, the government gradually issued a 
series of regulations and policies in an attempt to perfect the structure of the board of 
directors. For instance, the Chinese government stipulated Company Law in 1993, which not 
only required that listed companies must set up a board of directors to manage the companies 
on behalf of the shareholders, but also defined the responsibilities and rights of the board of 
directors in Chinese firms. In addition, the Code of Corporate Governance for Chinese listed 
company which is issued in 2002 also emphasized that listed companies must appoint 
independent directors and establish specialized professional committees including the audit 
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committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee in order to improve the 
governance framework. 
More specifically, regarding the board size, the revised corporate law of China (2005) did not 
impose a specific requirement for the size of boards, but stipulated that the size of board in the 
companies should be 5 to19 members. However, the empirical findings on the board size in 
China are also mixed and are similar with those in western countries. For instance, Cui and Lu 
(2008) found there is a positive relationship between corporate board size and accounting 
information transparency. In contrast , Sun (2000) indicated that there is a negative 
relationship between board size and firm performance. Similarly, Yu (2001) and Zheng 
(2004) found there is no significant relationship between board size and firm performance, in 
addition, Yu & Chi (2004b) and Qu (2007a) provided a reverse U-shaped relationship 
between board size and performance in Chinese listed companies.  
In China, CEO duality is regarded as one important barrier to influence the effectiveness of 
corporate governance. However, the empirical studies also reported mixed findings on the 
relationship between CEO duality and firm performance in China. For example, Song et al., 
(2006) found that there was a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance. Similarly, the finding was supported by Bai et al (2004). However, Tian and 
Lau (2001) reported that  CEO duality had a positive effect on firm performance. In addition, 
Wu et al. (2001). and Yu et al. (2002) noted that there was no significant relationship between 
CEO duality and firm performance based on the their empirical tests. 
Independent directors are also in the centre of the board structure in Chinese firms, thus the 
government issued a number of regulations and rules to specify the requirements and 
qualification of independent directors in Chinese listed companies. Specifically, in 2001, the 
CSRC issued the regulation ‗Guideline for Establishing an Independent Directors System for 
Listed Companies‘, which not only required that at least one-third of the board of each listed 
company should be independent, but also indicated that independent directors must spend 
enough time to perform their duties in the company. Furthermore, the Code of Corporate 
Governance (CSRC, 2002) emphasised the independence and responsibility of  independent 
directors in corporate governance. For example, the Code indicated that  
1. An independent director shall be independent from the listed company and the company‘s 
shareholders;  
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2. Independent directors shall bear the duties of good faith and due diligence toward the 
listed company;  
3. Independent directors shall protect the interests of minority shareholders; and  
4. Independent directors shall carry out their duties independently and shall not subject 
themselves to the influence of the company- related entities or persons.  
From the practical perspective, some scholars also indicated that independent directors have a 
positive impact on the firm performances, For example, Peng (2004) found that outside 
directors were related to improved organization performance measured by sales growth based 
on 405 listed Chinese companies from 1992 to 1996. Choa and Ruib (2009) studied the effect 
of independent directors in Chinese listed companies from 1999 to 2003 and suggested that 
the percentage of independent directors on the board had a positive effect on the firm 
performance. However, other scholars demonstrated that independent directors can not 
significantly improve the firm performance. for instances  Tian and Lau (2001) found that 
there was no significant relationship between the proportion of independent directors and firm 
performance in Chinese listed companies, similarly, Peng et al., (2004) reported that the 
independent directors had little impact on firm performance measured by return on equity and 
sales growth.   
To summarize the discussion above, Table 2.2 summarizes the composition of boards of 
directors and showed the characteristics of Chinese board during the period 2007 to 2009 
according to the report of corporate governance issued by Chinese Academy of Social Science 
(CASS) and Protiviti in 2010. 
Table 2.2   The average number of different types of directors on the boards of top 100  
                         Chinese listed companies 
 
Number of Directors 2009 2008 2007 
Board of Directors 11.65 11.15 11.45 
Executive Directors 2.91 2.97 2.68 
Non-Executive Directors 4.67 4.31 4.87 
Independent Directors 4.07 3.87 3.9 
    Source: Corporate governance rating of Chinese top 100 listed companies (Protiviti,  
                  CASS.2010) 
 
 
2.3.3 Concluding Remarks  
According to the theoretical bases of corporate governance, this section introduced corporate 
governance structure and identified the strong impact of governance structure on firm 
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performance. Specifically, this section mainly discussed the conception and characteristics of 
the ownership structure and the board of directors and emphasize that they play important 
roles in corporate governance.  
However, current researches showed that the relationship between governance structure and 
firm performance is mixed and complicated and suggested that scolars should explore the 
comprehensive methods to study the effectiveness of corporate governance. Therefore, in 
order to clearly explain the link between corporate governance structure and firm 
performance, we will pay close attention to the corporate governance process that establishes 
the link between corporate governance structure and firm performance. Sepecifically, scholars 
should incorporate the research on interving variable of the governance process to explain 
how corporate governance structure influences firm performance. Furthermore, because the 
boards of directors are viewed as the most important component of corporate governance and 
board process are at the heart of the governance process, some scholars (Finkelstein & 
Mooney, 2003; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005) emphasized we need to know more about board 
processes–what do directors do in the interaction process and how does the interaction among 
the directors influence the relationship between governance structure and firm performance? 
Furthermore, we should know what are the optimal board conditions and practices for task 
fulfilment, and how should board be constituted to meet the optimal conditions? This is the 
topic to which we now turn. 
2.4 Link between Corporate Governance Structure and Firm Performance 
The debate on the relationship between corporate governance structure and firm performance 
indicated that previous studies often made great inferential leaps from input variables such as 
board composition to output variables such as firm performance, and overlooked the 
importance of corporate governance process which presumably built the link between input 
and output, and directly affect the effectiveness of corporate governance structure. Therefore, 
in order to comprehensively understand the effect of corporate governance structure on firm 
performance, scholars suggested that we should focus on the impact of the corporate 
governance process on the relationship between corporate governance structure and the firm 
performance (Pettigrew, 1992).  
Furthermore, board processes are regarded as the centre of the governance process and play 
an important role in influencing the effectiveness and enficiency of corporate governance 
structure. Specifically, as some scholars demonstrated, differences in cognitive conflicts, 
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effort norms and use of knowledge and skills in board process will affect the effectiveness of 
the monitoring and advisory functions  of corporate board (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; 
Stiles & Taylor, 2001),and at last the relationshio between corporate governance structure and  
firm performance.  
Thus, this study will build a theoretical framework about corporate governance structure, 
board processes and firm performance to describe how the corporate governance affects firm 
performance. The links in Fig 2.2 shows that the effectiveness of corporate governance relies 
on not only the optimal governance structure, but also the social-psychological processes 
including board participation, critical discussion and exchange of information (Jackson, 1992; 
Milliken & Vollrath, 1991).  
To summarize discussions, differences in corporate governance structures may experience 
divergent interaction processes of boards of directors; furthermore, the effectiveness of 
divergent interaction may determine the quality of decision making and ultimately affects 
firm performance. Thus the following section will introduce the model of board process and 
discuss in detail how corporate governance structure influences the firm performance through 
the interaction processes within members of board. 
1. Board process 
In order to study the impact of intervening board processes on the association between 
governance structure and firm performance (Finkelstein, Hambrick, & Cannella, 2008), the 
research will focus on what boards of directors do and investigate the actual behaviour of 
boards. Mace(1971) summarized the behaviour of boards and described corporate boards‘ 
processes in practice as follows: 
”Directors selected are usually heads of equally prestigious organizations with 
primary responsibilities of their own … Most boards of directors serve as advisors 
and counselors to the presidents … Most boards of directors serve as some sort of 
discipline for the organization – as a corporate conscience …  
A few boards of directors establish company objectives, strategies and broad policies. 
Most do not … A few boards evaluate and measure the performance of the president 
and select and de-select the president. Most do not.” (p. 107) 
Consistent with these descriptions, Fama and Jensen (1983a) summarized that the essential 
responsibility of the directors is decision control in the governance process. That is, they 
 34 
allocate the decision-making process into four steps so that the board acts as the control 
mechanism to reduce the potential divergence of interests between corporate management and 
shareholders in the modern corporation by the: 
“1. Initiation: generation of proposals for resource utilization and structuring of      
contracts; 
2. Ratification: choice of the decision initiatives to be implemented; 
3. Implementation: execution of ratified decision; and 
4. Monitoring: measurement of the performance of decision agents and implantation 
of rewards” (p.303) 
The initiation and implementation of decisions are combined with decision management and 
allocated to the responsibility of managers. At the same time, the ratification and monitoring 
of decisions are also combined with decision control and then become the responsibility of the 
board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983b). 
Furthermore, some scholars have explored how the boards act as groups to be responsible for 
the decision control in order to open the ‗black box‘ of board process and dynamics (R. W. 
Leblanc, 2004). That is, how do boards perform their functions in corporate governance? 
What are the mechanics by which the boards do their jobs (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 
2010)? Thus, scholars explained that the effectiveness of the process depended on three 
specific board processes: cognitive conflict, efforts norms and use of knowledge and skill 
(Finkelstein & Mooney, 2003; Forbes & Milliken, 1999; R. Leblanc & Schwartz, 2007). 
1.1 Cognitive conflict  
Cognitive conflict refers to differences in judgements about a task or disagreement about 
content of a task among directors. That is, directors who face complex issues and decisions 
always characterize problems differently and express varying opinions about solutions to 
problems, which leads to cognitive conflict on the board and then affect the managerial role of 
directors in the strategic decision control and the quality of strategic decisions through 
consideration of more alternatives (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1997; Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999). Therefore, differences in corporate governance structure will lead to different 
levels of cognitive conflict in the boardroom and have important effects on the quality of 
decision control. For example, some organizational behaviourists have found that large boards 
will become difficult to be coordinated effectively and will hamper the board‘s ability to 
extract and use its members‘ potential contribution, because they found that cognitive conflict 
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of  large boards may diminish interpersonal attraction among directors and also make them 
reduce their commitment to the board (Nemeth & Staw, 1989; Reality, 2006).  
1.2 Effort norms 
Effort norms are a group-level construct and refer to a group‘s shared beliefs regarding the 
level of effort which each individual is expected to put toward a task (Wageman, 1995). That 
is, the effort is the intensity of an individual‘s task performance behaviour; the norm may 
have a strong impact on the member‘s behaviour. therefore, a strong effort norm can enhance 
the effort of directors to a higher firm performance because the higher effort norms can 
promote the directors to devote a large amount of time and energy to evaluate the strategic 
decision alternatives and monitor the top managers (Forbes & Milliken, 1999).  
To date, a number of studies have showed that the governance structure can affect the effort 
norms to improve or reduce firm performance in different ways. For instance, scholars have 
suggested that a firm should increase the proportion of independent directors in the 
boardroom because independent directors can show that the firm is doing a good job to 
enhance effort norms among inside directors. Similarly, they also found that CEO duality can 
lead to higher effort norms than the separation of CEO and chairman (Goodstein & Boeker, 
1991; Pye & Pettigrew, 2005). 
1.3 Use of knowledge and skills  
Use of knowledge and skills refers to the board‘s ability to apply the knowledge and skills to 
its tasks (Amason, 1996; Amason & Sapienza, 1997). That is, directors with different 
backgrounds can bring different knowledge and skills to influence the effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance. Therefore, differences in corporate governance structure 
will show the different results on the use of knowledge and skills and, in turn, affect the 
effectiveness of decision control in the firms. For example, some scholars (e.g., Cohen & 
Frazzini, 2008) suggest that a firm should increase the number of independent directors on the 
boards because the independent directors can bring the important information about business 
practices and policies to improve capability of problem-solving and facilitate the group 
discussion. In addition, other scholars also emphasized that board size can influence 
performance of the board because members of the board can provide a large amount of 
expertise and knowledge in terms of their different backgrounds which contribute to the 
quality of the strategic discussion on the board (Harris & Raviv, 2008).  
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2. Concluding remarks   
Understanding the linkage between corporate governance structure and firm performance is 
among the most important areas of corporate governance research. As discussed above, 
corporate governance is treated as a structure and process that exists in oversight roles and 
responsibilities in the corporate context (D. C. Hambrick et al., 2008). Therefore, the study 
describes the relationship between the corporate governance structure and the board process, 
and between the board process and firm performance, and furthermore shows evidence of a 
nascent governance structure-board process–firm performance framework to explain in details 
how the corporate governance structure affects the firm performance, as figure 2.2 illustrates.  
Although this framework emphasised the importance of understanding the roles of boards in 
our understanding of firm behaviour with respect to setting policy to regulate the corporate 
activities (Adams et al., 2010), Dalton and Daily(1999) indicated that results on the 
association between governance structure and performance are still vexing, contradictory, 
mixed and inconsistent. Hence, corporate governance structure can be regarded as the 
necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for the firm performance improvement. That is, 
studies on the role of board processes can help academics clarify the complexity of 
governance structure including the ownership structure and board design; in the meantime, 
these studies also can encourage us to consider other critical factors which can intervene in 
the interaction processes of the board of directors and influence the effectiveness of corporate 
governance structure. 
Therefore, various intervening board processes will influence the impact of governance 
structure on firm performance through cognitive conflict, efforts norms and use of knowledge 
and skills. At the same time, a number of upper echelon scholars (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; 
M. A. Eisenberg, 1976; Linck et al., 2008) also suggested that we should draw attention to the 
impact of demographic characteristics of the directors on the decision making in the 
boardroom. Hence, this research integrates the demographic characteristics of directors (such 
as age, functional track and tenure) into the corporate governance framework to explore new 
ways of improving corporate governance (D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Next, I turn to 
the upper echelon theory. 
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          Source: an integrated model of corporate governance (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) 
Figure 2.2  The relationship between governance structure, board process and firm performance
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2.5 Upper Echelon Theory 
Upper echelon theory, originally developed by Hambrick and Mason in 1984, has occupied an 
important place in organization research and offers another explanation of how a firm‘s 
strategy emerges from interactions in a complex environment. Three important tenets provide 
the foundation for upper echelon theory (M. A. Carpenter, M. A. Geletkanycz, & W. M. 
Sanders, 2004b):  
1.  Strategic choices in the firm are reflections of the values and cognitive biases of top 
executives; 
2.   Values and cognitive biases are a function of the top managers‘ characteristics including 
age, functional track and tenure; and, as a result; 
3.  Significant outcomes will be related to these characteristics of top managers. 
 
Specifically, firstly, the theory lie in the bounded rationality which argues that managerial 
strategic choices are affected by the natural limitation of managers as human beings(Cyert & 
March, 1963).Secondly, the theory emphasises that demographic heterogeneity of top 
management team (TMT) will have a significant impact on  organizational performance, 
because they inject a great deal of their experience, personalities and value into their 
behaviour and often study the world through the lenses of their personal histories, 
background, knowledge, values and other personal biases (Hambrick and Mason 1984).  
These may be described by Finkelstein and Hambrick(2008) as follows: 
“In the face of the complex, multitudinous, and ambiguous information that typifies 
the top management task, no two strategists will identify the same array of options for the 
firm; they will rarely prefer the same options; they almost certainly will not implement them 
identically. Biases, egos, aptitudes, experiences, and other human factors in the executive 
ranks greatly affect what happens to companies. This is not to say that managers are weak or 
sinister, only that they are human and limited.” (p. 5)  
In summary, this theory illustrated that the impact of top managers‘s demography on the 
cognitive process will affect strategic choice and firm performance and reveals the linkage of 
the situation, demographic characteristics, strategic choice and outcome in the 
firm.Furthermore, because the directors are defined as supra-top management team with 
involvement in the decision making, the directors‘ demographic characteristics should reflect 
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their cognitive biases and value,and can significantly affect the information processing and 
strategic choice and then the firm performance (Carpenter et al., 2004a).  
Therefore, upper echelon theory offers us a new way to enrich the corporate governance 
framework and proposed that insights about corporate governance should have a broad scope 
that encompasses quite complex matters such as the demographic characteristics of directors 
in corporate governance.that is, this theory showed that it is difficult for scholars and 
policymakers to understand the effectiveness of implementation of  relevant governance 
mechanisms in the organization unless they concern the personal demographic characteristics 
of directors ,because , when directors often faces a large number of internal and external 
forces in the complex environment ,directors‘ demographic characteritics will affect directors‘ 
performance and behaviour in the board process and then the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. (Huse, 2007; Marnet, 2008)  
In the following section, I review the literature on upper echelon theory and explain how the 
directors‘ demographic characteristics affect the firm performance.   
2.5.1 Theoretical Base of Upper Echelon Theory 
Upper Echelon perspective is based on the bounded rationality which is different from the 
theoretical base of the agency theory. Specifically, the agency model of corporate governance 
of organizations depends largely upon the conventional assumption that economic man is 
rational and can make optimal decisions. However, the mixed results showed that research 
about corporate governance should relax the assumptions of agency theory and acknowledge 
the bounded rationality of human beings because the strategic choices will be affected the 
level of cognitive biase and value of the top management team in the complex environment. 
Therefore, I should discuss the difference between the bounded rationality and economic man 
and pay attention to their impact on cognitive biase and value of the directors. 
According to the classical economic theory of organization, man is assumed to be economic 
or rational and always makes ―optimal‖ choices in a highly specified and defined 
environment. Specifically, the theory assumes that (March & Simon, 1958): 
“1. All the alternatives of choice are given;  
 2. All the consequences attached to each alternative are known; 
3. The rational man has a complete utility-ordering for all possible sets of 
consequence.”(p. 128) 
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Therefore, rational man operating in organizations are expected to generate options 
prospectively and select the best or optimal alternative for reaching a particular goal (March 
et al., 1958). 
However, there are some problems in the model of rational man. For example, rational man 
will choose different alternatives when he lacks enough information to estimate the 
probability of outcomes. that is , as some scholars have indicated (March et al., 1958) that 
rational man always uses a simplified model to capture the main features of a problem and, as 
a result , can not capture all the complexities due to the limits of human intellectual capacities. 
Therefore, Simon (1963) introduced the concept of bounded rationality, which proposed that 
optimal choice is limited or restricted by the limited mental abilities of organizational actors 
and their institutional practices.  
Specifically, decision makers in an organization often generate potential alternatives or 
solution for the problems. However, due to their limited mental capacities, they can not 
analyze all alternatives and solutions in the complexity of the environment. As a result, they 
can only adopt a ‗satisficing‘ rather than an optimizing strategy; that is, they can only 
discover  satisfactory solutions in relation to aspiration levels (Dequech, 2001). As Simon 
(2000) explained: 
“Bounded rationally is simply the idea that choices people make are determined not 
only by some consistent overall goal and the properties of the external world, but also by the 
knowledge that decision maker do and don‟t have of the world, their ability or inability to 
evoke that knowledge when it is relevant, action, to cope with uncertainty and to adjudicate 
among their many competing wants. …consequently, rational behaviour in the real world is 
as much determined by the inner environment of people‟s minds, both their memory contents 
and their processes as by the outer environment of the world on which they act, and which 
acts on them.” (p. 25) 
Hence, the bounded rationality theorists provided a new explanation of the behaviour of man, 
and indicated that the choices which are generated by decision makers in organizations cannot 
be regarded as optimal solutions because the choices can only reflect a certain situation or 
condition that is determined by the factors in the history and social environment, and will be 
influenced by decision makers‘ cognitive biases, value and interest.  
Based on bounded rationality, some scholars build the upper echelon theory and argued that 
managerial choices are often affected by the natural limitations of managers as humans not 
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complying with the rational motive that is used by classical organization theory, and further 
establish a theoretical framework in which executive cognition, values and perceptions 
influence the process of strategic choice and ultimately performance outcomes, because the 
reason is that  they believe that managerial values and perceptions  are limited by bounded 
rationality, which is the type of rationality that people resort to when the environment in 
which they operate is too complex compared with their limited mental abilities (Carpenter et 
al., 2004b).    
2.5.2  Theoretical Model of Upper Echelon Theory 
Upper echelon theory indicates that the composition of the top management team is the 
determinant of firm outcomes and proposes that the demographic characteristics of the top 
management team will predict the performance of companies. That is, top managers‘ decision 
processes will be affected by their own cognitive biases, attitudes and values, because their 
cognitive biases,values and attitudes not only limit top executives‘ field of vision and 
selective perception, but also filter information through the lens of cognition in the process 
(D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Furthermore, because cognitive biases, values and attitudes 
are difficult to reliably measure, scholars used demographic variables (including age, tenure, 
education and functional track) as proxies for  the quality of cognitive biase, values and 
attitudes and can discuss the impact of top management team (TMT) demographic 
characteristics on firm performance (Richard & Shelor, 2002a).  
Specifically, upper echelon theory (D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Knight et al., 1999) has 
two interconnected parts: the first is that executives act on the basis of their personalized 
interpretations of the strategic situation they face; and second, personalized constructs are a 
function of the executives‘ experiences, values and personalities. Furthermore, Hambrick et 
al., (2005) explain that the mechanism which converts executives‘ biases into behaviours is an 
information filtering process. That is, executives‘ characteristics serve to filter and distort 
information in a three-step process: executives‘ experiences, values and personalities affect 
their:  
„(1) Field of vision (the directions they look and listen);  
(2) Selective perception (what they actually see and hear); and  
(3) Interpretation (how they attach meaning to what they see and hear.‟ (p.111)  
In summary, because the situation consists of a series of more complex phenomena than the 
executive can understand, the executives engage in the three-step information filtering process 
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to achieve a highly personalized constructed reality on the basis of their orientation including 
a set of the psychological characteristics (including: values and personality) and observable 
experiences (including: age, functional background and so forth).  
1. Limited field of vision 
As the first step of the filtering process, executives confront far more stimuli than those they 
can comprehend. However, they vary widely in how much they can scan in the environment 
and have different abilities to analyse external events and trends due to their  limited focus of 
attention (Finkelstein, Cannella, et al., 2008; Finkelstein, Hambrick, et al., 2008; Simon, 
2000). That is, as Ocasio (1997) emphasised, decision makers are selective and constrain their 
attention to a limited set of stimuli, because physical, economic and institutional factors 
impinge upon the environment of the decision. For instance, Chattopadhyay et al. (1999) 
found that a top executive‘s network of contracts is an important factor in influencing their 
field of vision because top executives receive and distribute information through their 
network. Therefore, a CEO who has a network in industry associations is different from a 
CEO who does not have a lot of intra-industry ties (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997).  
2. Selective perception 
As a second step of the filtering process, selective perception is the process by which 
executives perceive a portion of the stimuli based on their field of vision. Thus the effective 
filtering process should integrate the relevant information into the perception foreground and 
delete the irrelevant information to the background (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
Specifically, Starbuck et al. (1988) describe selective perception as the noticing process that 
can classify stimuli as signals and noise, and found that the noticing result is a combination of 
characteristics of stimuli and the characteristics of perceivers. However, the characteristics of 
perceivers also influence both the availabilities of stimuli and the abilities of stimuli to attract 
attention (Wohlwill & Kohn, 1976). That is, some information within the executives‘ field of 
vision is meaningful and engaging; other information will escape the executives‘ attention 
entirely. Therefore, decision makers will only see a portion of what they watch and hear a 
portion of what they listen to (Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1967; Starbuck & Milliken, 
1988). 
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3. Interpretation 
As a third step of the filtering process, interpretation is the process by which the executives 
interpret meaning to stimuli and has distinct aspects including comprehending, understanding, 
explaining and attributing, extrapolating and predicting. Specifically, in this step, top 
managers are studied to see how they categorize stimuli and how they apply stimuli to draw 
conclusions (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). For example, Dutton and Jackson (1987) 
emphasised that interpreting stimuli as issues as either a threat or an opportunity can influence 
both subsequent information processing and the motivation of key decision makers. Similarly, 
other scholars demonstrated how executives categorized the stimuli, and found that CEOs can 
categorize ill-structured problems faster than MBA students and also had greater variance in 
the number of categories used in terms of their well-developed heuristics in the early stage of 
decision-making (Day & Lord, 1992).   
To sum up, in the first and second steps of the filtering process, because executives cannot 
understand every aspect of the environmental and organizational stimuli, they selectively 
perceive and filter environmental stimuli on the basis of their orientation which affects their 
field of vision. In the third step of the process, the executives interpret meaning to the stimuli 
that have been noticed. Consequently, the executives arrive at a different understanding of a 
given situation in terms of their own personal orientation. 
Figure 2.3 describes the relationship between TMT demographic diversity and firm 
performance and proposes a theoretical framework that describes the interactive effect of the 
variables of demographic diversity and organization or environmental context on the major 
dimensions of the company performance. The left side represents the strategic situation, 
potential environmental and organizational stimuli. The right side characterizes strategic 
choice, such as major choices made formally, competitive action associated with strategy and 
important administrative choice (Child, 1972). The middle of the model is the information 
filtering process through which executives construct the selective perception of the strategic 
situation and determine what should be done. In the process, executives‘ demographic 
characteristics are regarded as the one of the determinants of the strategic choice and of 
organizational performance through the strategic choices. That is, March and Simon (1963) 
indicated that decision makers bring their own set of ―givens‖ to an administrative situation. 
These givens reflect not only the decision makers‘ cognitive biases but also their own values 
and serves to filter and distort the decision makers‘ perception of situations both inside and 
outside the organization (D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984). 
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In China, scholars have also drawn attention to studies about the top management team from 
different perspectives; specifically they discuss not only the theoretical base of upper echelon 
theory, but also amended its conceptual framework to enhance the theory. For instance, Cui 
and Hu (2007) indicated that upper echelon theory establishes the relationship among TMT‘s 
demographic characteristics, strategic outcome and firm performance based on the following 
assumptions,   
1.     The psychological structure of TMT influences the process of decision making;  
2.     The psychological structure is characterised by bounded rationality; 
3.     The demographic characteristics of TMT can reflect on the psychological structure of      
        TMT; and  
4.     The demographic characteristics of TMT can influence the firm performance.  
In addition, Jiao(2003) indicated that the firm should focuses on not only the top manager‘s 
demographic characteristics, but also the reform of institutions which has a significant impact 
on performance of top managers in order to improve the effectiveness of the top management 
team. Furthermore, Sun and Wu (2003) summarized the literature about upper echelon theory 
during the period 1984 to 2001 and established an amended theoretical framework which can 
be regarded as a useful supplement to upper echelon research. Specifically, their framework 
summarized some of the relevant studies and emphasised that the TMT process can act to 
mediate the relationship between team diversity and firm performance. For example, Simons 
et al. (1999) found that debate in the process can mediate the interactive effects of diversity 
and decision comprehensiveness. Knight et al. (1999) noticed that demographic diversity 
affected the firm outcomes through two processes: interpersonal conflict and agreement 
seeking. Similarly, other scholars (O‘Reilly Iii, Snyder, & Boothe, 1993) demonstrated that 
TMT homogeneity is related to better team dynamics and more efficient firm adaptation to 
change in the TMT process. Furthermore, their study intergrates the culture and 
organizational environment into the theoretical model to enrich our understanding of upper 
echelone theory.  
To summarize the discussion above, the upper echelon theoretical framework has established 
a clear relationship between top management team diversity, strategic choice and firm 
outcome, and calls for more attention to the impact of demographic charateritics heterogeneity 
of top management team on the firm performance.  
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4. Interaction process within the top management team 
According to upper echelon theory, the top management team members depend on their 
cognitive biases and value to interpret the situation and then decide on the appropriate 
response to the important stimuli, at the same time, they will also discard information that is 
less important when the top management team faced complexity in their tasks (Weick, 1979). 
However, because it is difficult to gain access to the psychological dimensions of the top 
management team and their actual behaviour and to accurately assess the values and cognition 
of the team, some scholars suggested that the demographic characteristics of the top 
management team can be regarded as causal variables to be used as proxies for the cognitive 
biases and value, which can help us to overcome the difficult problem of gaining access to 
executives to measure the psychological and group dynamic variables. For example, Pfeffer 
(1983) indicated that demography can be considered as an important causal variable that 
affect a number of intervening variables and processes and then a number of organizational 
outcomes. Hambrick and Mason (1984) also indicated that a manager‘s personal experience 
and values can be inferred from observable demographic characteristics. Therefore, 
policymakers and scholars have futher studied the interaction process among the members of 
the top management team based on demographic characteristics. 
Specifically, some scholars described in detail the interaction of members of TMT with 
heterogeneous demographic characteristics, and indicated that heterogeneous demographic 
characteristics of top managers have a positive effect on their perception, interpretion and 
strategic choice. For instance, Wanous and Youtz (1986) discussed the effect of 
heterogeneous characteristics on creativity and indicated that different members in a group 
have different recommended solutions because of their different views on the strategic 
situation , consequently, the diverse solutions enhance the quality of the decision making, 
similarly Carpenter (2002) found that the diversity of information sources and perspectives 
have a positive impact on cognition and perception and also suggested whether each 
perspective holds true about the situation based on the level of complexity that top 
management team faced. In addition, Glick, Miller and Huber (1993)  proposed that the 
diversity of the top management team influenced the open system effectiveness through the 
comprehensiveness of decision making, communication and cohesion, ultimately improving 
the firm‘s outcomes. Similarly, Geletkanycs and Hambrick (1997) indicated that the 
informational and social effect of externalities of top managers was reflected in the degree to 
which the firm‘s strategy conforms to strategic objectives.  
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However, other scholars argue that the interaction of TMT with demographic heterogeneity 
negatively impacts team functioning and social integration in top management team. For 
example, Amason (1996) indicated that heterogeneous demographic characteristics increased 
conflicts to weakened the ability of the group to work together because conflict may be an 
impediment to consensus and affective acceptance. Ancona and Caldwell (1992) explained 
that diversity in the top management team reduced group identification and cohesiveness 
because it negatively influenced the internal task process and external commutation. 
Additionally, Bunderson and Sutcliffe (2002) found that demographic heterogeneity reduced 
communication frequency and was negatively associated with information sharing for the top 
management team. 
To summarize the discussion above, interaction effects of demographic heterogeneity in top 
management team are mixed, the potential reasons are that there are another two important 
issues to influence the effect of TMT heterogeneity on the firm functioning. The first is life 
stage of the top management team. As Chatman and Flynn(2001) indicated, there is a negative 
impact of diversity on decision making at the initial stage of a team‘s life, but the negative 
effects will be reduced over time. The second is that we should draw attention to the effects of 
group-level diversity on the firm outcome because the research on diversity is defined as 
involvement in interaction and decision within a team (Pelled, Eisenhardt, & Xin, 1999).  
In sum, this section discussed the interaction process within top management team. In the next 
section, this study will document a number of empirical studies of the effects of the TMT‘s 
demographic heterogeneity on firm outcome, and has presented a complex picture about the 
relationship between TMT heterogeneity and firm performance. 
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Source: upper echelon: the organizations as reflections of  its top managers(D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984)      
Figure 2.3  Theoretical Model of the Top Management Team decision process 
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2.5.3 The Effect of the Top Managers’ Demographic Characteristics on Firm 
performance 
Since the upper echelon theory emerged in 1984, there is a large number of  empirical 
literatures to study whether the top management team‘s demographic characteristics can be a 
strongly linked to organization performance. More specifically, following upper echelon 
theory, some scholars indicated that heterogeneous demography in the top management team 
can create differential information collection and solution generation, and then contribute to 
the organization performance (D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984). That is, TMT along with the 
demographic characteristics heterogeneity strongly affects the cognitive processing capability 
of the TMT and consequently the strategic outcome of the firm.  
Therefore, using a composite measure of TMT heterogeneity, some academics have reported 
that there is a significant link between TMT heterogeneity and the firm performance. For 
example, Bantel and Jackson (1989) examined the impact of the demographic characteristics 
of  the TMT on the innovative banks and found that heterogeneity of education and functional 
background had a positive effect on the innovation in banking. Wiersema and Bantel (1992) 
reported that top managers‘ cognitive perspectives which is measured by the top management 
team‘s demographic characteristics including age, organizational tenure and educational level 
were linked to their propensity to change corporate strategy. In addition, Tihanyi, Ellstrand, 
Daily and Dalton (2000) found that the average tenure, education, international experience 
and tenure heterogeneity in top management team were positively related to the global 
strategic posture. Bergh (2001) also examined the relationship of the impact of the tenure of 
the executives on  successful acquisitions and indicated that long-tenured executives were 
positively associated with acquisition performance.   
However, other empirical results indicated that there are some disadvantages in the 
demographic characteristics heterogeneity of the TMT. Firstly, demographic characteristics 
heterogeneity may affect the TMT cohesiveness and caused interpersonal conflicts among the 
member of the TMT because heterogeneous TMTs may vary in attitudes and values on their 
environment (Bantel & Jackson, 1989). Secondly, some scholars indicate that demographic 
characteristics heterogeneity may also negatively influence the social integration and 
communication that are the main drivers of  firm performance because, top managers who 
have not similar backgrounds can not  share common life experiences and values and may not  
find the experience of interaction with each other easier, which negatively affects speedy and 
efficient coordination in the decision making (D. C. Hambrick, Cho, & Chen, 1996).  
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At the same time, a number of empirical studies also show a negative or insignificant 
relationship between heterogeneous TMTs and firm performance. For example, Smith et al. 
(1994a) found that the impact of TMT function experience heterogeneity on the return on 
investment was negative. Michel and Hambrick (1992) indicated that the relationship between 
various measures of TMT heterogeneity and firm performance were not significant and found 
that average tenure and homogeneity in core function experience could increase firm 
performance. Hambrick et al. (1996) noted that heterogeneous teams with difference 
functional backgrounds, education and tenure were slower in their actions and responses and 
less likely than homogeneous teams to respond to competitors‘ initiatives.  
In the case of China, scholars have also enriched the research perspective on the effect of 
TMT demographic characteristics on firm performance over the last decade. For instance, 
some scholars found the positive effect of top management team‘ heterogeneity on firm 
performance. Li et al., (2009) found a positive effect of cognitive conflict in the top 
management team on entrepreneurial strategy making in China‘s technology industries and 
suggested that a TMT with a higher level of cognitive conflict will be more entrepreneurial in 
its strategic decision making. Similarly, Xiao (2008) studied the association between the 
background characteristics of the TMT and fund performance in China‘s mutual funds. The 
results showed that the financial experience and educational background of the TMT had a 
positive effect on the fund performance.  
However, other Chinese scholars have demonstrated that TMT‘ demographic heterogeneity 
has a negative impact on the firm performance. For example, Zhang (2006) studied the impact 
of heterogeneous TMT on firm performance based on 356 Chinese listed firms during the 
period 2001-2002, and found that tenure heterogeneity and functional heterogeneity of the 
TMT were negatively related to firm performance.Similarly Wei and Wang (2002 ) found that 
the heterogeneity of TMT‘ characteristics (including: age, educational background, and work 
experience) had not significantly impacts on firm performance in China‘s listed companies. 
2.5.4 The Effect of the Board Directors’ Demographic Characteristics on Firm 
Performance 
Upper echelon theory is utilized not only to explain the impact of the top management team 
characteristics on the firm outcomes, but also to propose the importance of the demographic 
characteristics of directors on the firm performance, because, as Finkelstein and Hambrick 
(1996) indicated, the directors can also be defined as supra-top management team with 
involvement in the strategic decision making. That is,  
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“Boards can directly affect strategy through involvement of their members on the 
committees, recommendations to top management, and oversight of executive decisions. 
Boards can indirectly affect strategy by reducing interorganizational dependencies and by 
conveying information about other firm‟s strategies.”(p. 240) 
Furthermore, they (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) described the main responsibilities and 
functions of the board of directors, and emphasized that board plays an important role in the 
company. First, boards of directors play a monitoring role for the firm, e.g., they can monitor 
the managers‘ compensation and performance to supervise the proper use of the firm‘s 
wealth. Secondly, directors are the most important actors in determining strategic direction 
and improving decision making in the firm. For example, some scholars (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003) point out that directors can act as boundary spanners in the environment to secure 
resources for the organization and provide strategic advice to aid the performance in firm. 
Similarly, they also found that directors can reduce the negative impact of environmental 
uncertainty on firm performance through connecting the firm to the outside community and 
bringing in information, skills and legitimacy to the firm. 
Therefore, scholars have extended upper echelon theory to research on the demographic 
characteristics of the boards of directors. That is, they indicated that directors‘ demographic 
characteristics will significantly influence the strategic decision making and are highly related 
to firm outcome. For instance, Pfeffer (1972) found that board members with different 
constituencies can provide critical resource to improve the effectiveness of decision making in 
the firm. Kosnik (1990) indicated that heterogeneity of directors‘ background can promote the 
airing of different perspectives for the evaluation of managers proposals and then produce 
different solutions to the problems and multiple decision criteria for strategic decisions. 
Golden and Zajac (2001) argued that certain demographic characteristics of the directors can 
have a strong effect on strategic change in the firm and found that the average age of the 
board members was associated with strategic change and there was a curvilinear relationship 
between occupational heterogeneity and strategic change.  
However, Kosnik (1990) also posited that demographic heterogeneity in the board of directors 
will impede the group thinking process of the board and its efforts to make strategic decisions 
because the greater heterogeneity of the directors led to greater potential conflicts of interest 
based on directors‘ different definitions of firm objectives and policies (Powell, 1991). 
Golden and Zajac (2001) indicated that, beyond a certain point, the benefit from the 
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occupational heterogeneity would be outweighed because of conflict and disagreement in the 
boardroom.  
In Chinese cases, Cheng, Chan and Leung (2010) examined the effect of chairperson‘s 
demography on the firm performance. They found that the chairperson possessing higher 
education could generate more superior firm performance; however, the gender and tenure of 
chairperson had no significant effect on the firm performance. Xiao (2008) focused on the 
management demography of board members in Chinese mutual fund sector and noticed that 
the financial background of the independent directors and the education heterogeneity of 
board members were positively related to fund performance.  
2.6 Concluding Remarks 
As discussed above, firstly the chapter has reviewed corporate governance from various 
theoretical perspectives including agency theory, stakeholder theory, stewardship theory and 
resource-dependence theory, and described the central mechanisms of corporate governance: 
ownership structure and board of directors. Second, I has also explained that the linkage 
between governance structure and firm performance through the board process. Finally, this 
chapter introduced upper echelon theory and explains the impact of cognition, values and 
perceptions of top management team and board members on the process of strategic choice. 
Furthermore, because cognition, values and perceptions are difficult to evaluate in the firm, 
upper echelon theorists suggest that demographic characteristics can be used as proxies for 
cognition, values and perception and discuss the effect of demographic heterogeneity in top 
management team on the firm performance.  
Hence, the chapter found a major gap between corporate governance and upper echelon 
theory. That is, previous literature largely discussed the impact of corporate governance or the 
top management team‘s demographic characteristics on the firm performance separately. I 
have found little or no research that integrates two areas in one conceptual framework, that is, 
few scholars drew attention to the interactive effect between directors‘ demographic 
characteristics and corporate governance on the firm performance. Thus, this study integrates 
upper echelon theory into the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance and explains how the interaction of the directors‘ demographic characteristics 
and corporate governance influence the firm performance.  
More specifically, following the logic of the ‗input- process-output‘ sequence, governance 
structure influences firm performance through the interaction effect in the board process 
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because, when individuals are grouped and arranged in a particular way and in a specific 
framework, they behave differently from a group structured in a different way (Becker & 
Baloff, 1969), that is, differences in board size, board independence and CEO duality will 
trigger differences in the cognition, efforts norms and the use of skills and knowledge within 
board processes and will have different effects on firm performance (B. Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990a; Carpenter & Westphal, 2001). Therefore, this chapter establishes an 
integrated paradigm for contributing to the knowledge of corporate governance. 
However, a continuing series of corporate governance failures indicated that the key to 
constructing an effective corporate governance model is still to understand comprehensively 
how corporate governance can effectively improve the firm performance through 
strengthening the function of the board of directors, therefore, Jensen (2000) pointed out that 
scholars and practitioners should identify the factors that lead to the failures or successes of 
corporate governance from broad perspectives. That is, research on corporate governance 
should not only recognize accurate positive theories of cause-and-effect relationships, but also 
understand normative propositions and decisions based on them in corporate governance (Van 
Frederikslust, Ang, & Sudarsanam, 2007). 
In the meantime, upper echelon theorists focus on the effect of demographic characteristics on 
firm performance and provided another meaningful ways to investigate the important 
intervening variables of the association between corporate governance and firm performance. 
That is, when corporate governance structure influences firm performance through interaction 
process of the board (such as cognitive conflicts, effort norms and use of skill and 
knowledge), directors‘ demographic characteristics which are regarded as proxies for their 
cognitions and values also will influence the effectiveness of the board process and then 
moderate the relationship between corproate governance and firm performance. For instance, 
the heterogeneity of age, functional track and tenure will not only affect the effectiveness of 
the use of skill and knowledge, but also lead to the significant cognitive conflict among the 
members of board, because the demographic heterogeneity will not only increase the 
difficulties in understanding alternatives for strategic decision, but also  hamper the 
effectiveness of  debate and communcation within board of directors (Pelled, 1996). 
Similarly, some scholars also find that board members with different demographic 
characteristics cannot share a language that reflects similarities in interpreting, understanding 
and responding to information, and consequently have a negative impact on effort norms in 
the boardroom (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). 
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Therefore, this study will improve our understanding how the corporate governance structure 
can affect firm performance, and elaborate on the original framework of corporate governance 
through adding the demography of directors to the framework of corporate governance. That 
is, as in Figure 2.4, this study will combine demographic characteristics with the linkage 
between corporate governance and firm performance and reflect the directors‘demography as 
significant moderating variables to influence the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
To summarize the above discussion, the focus of the study is not only the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance, but also the moderating effect of 
demographic characteristics on the relationship. Hence, the research will go beyond 
conventional corporate governance models by examining the characteristics of directors as an 
important moderator of the association between corporate governance structure and firm 
performance and aim to get a profound insight into the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Therefore, this is an opportunity to not only contribute to the research on the theoretical bases 
of corporate governance, but also develop a comprehensive model to perfect the practices of 
corporate governance. 
In the following chapter, my first objective is to evaluate the impact of corporate governance 
on the firm performance. My second is to investigate whether directors‘ demographic 
characteristics can moderate the strength of the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. That is, it is hoped that the interaction of directors‘ demographic 
characteristics and corporate governance can provide a holistic picture of the development of 
corporate governance. Next, this study will suggest a series of hypotheses in terms of  this 
integrated theoretical framework and then provide the empirical evidence to validate the 
theoretical framework that explain the interactive effect of  directors‘ demographic  
characteristics and corporate governance on firm performance. 
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Figure 2.4 The Integrated Conceptual Framework 
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     Chapter 3                                                                                       
Hypotheses 
3.1 The Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
During past decades, scholars designed corporate governance mechanisms to discipline 
managers through monitoring and advising by the board of directors, because managers are 
self-interested, risk averse and pursue their own goals that may diverge from those of the 
shareholders. Therefore, as discussed above, good corporate governance should effectively 
improve the firm performance (Hammer & Champy, 1993; Hart, 1995a; Williamson, 1996). 
Specifically, scholars have provided explanations for the positive effect of corporate 
governance on firm performance. For example, some scholars have found that corporate 
governance can increase the managerial efficiency of capital and then improve the 
performance of firms. Shleifer and Vishny (1997b) indicated that a firm with effective 
corporate governance can invest in profitable projects and then increase the efficiency of 
operation and higher cash flow. In addition,  scholars also discuss the relationship between 
corporate governance and financial performance from the reputation building perspective; for 
instance, Durnev and Kim (2005) noted that firms with higher governance and transparency 
ranking will have a higher valuation in the stock market.  
However, other scholars have different views on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. For example, Cremers and Ferrell (2009) examined the 
effects of corporate governance on the firm‘s operational performance and found a negative 
association between corporate governance and firm performance. Similarly, Larcker, 
Richardson and Tuna (2007) also found that the relationship between governance and 
accounting outcome was inconsistent. In sum, the empirical results corporate governance 
presented mixed impacts of corporate governance on firm performance. 
In China, the research on the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance has also attracted greater attention of scholars and policy makers during the past 
three decades. For example, from academic perspectives ,Qian (1996) introduced in detail the 
Chinese enterprise reform and discussed the agency problem and political control in corporate 
governance and emphasised the important effect of corporate governance on the performance 
improvement in Chinese firms . Similarly, Schipani and Junhai (2001) identified patterns in 
the evolution of the system of corporate governance and offered some suggestions to improve 
the effectiveness of corproate governance. In addition,  from practice perspectives, Chen 
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(2005) not only described the main characteristics of Chinese corporate governance, but also 
focused on the impact of ownership structure on the IPO under pricing, financial performance 
and debt finance in China. Xu and Wang (1999) indicated that there was a positive 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm profitability and emphasized the 
importance of large institutional shareholders in Chinese listed firms.  
In summary, a large number of studies have investigated the impact of corporate governance 
on the financial performance or market valuation in both the developed market and emerging 
economy. However, findings showed that effect of corporate governance on the firm outcome 
are complicated and mixed based on a single mechanism of corporate governance. Therefore, 
this study will combine some important mechanisms into a corporate governance index and 
examine the effect of corporate governance on financial performance from a comprehensive 
perspective.  
3.1.1 Corporate Governance Index 
During past decades, many studies have evaluated the quality of corporate governance based 
on particular single aspects of corporate governance, such as board size, independent directors 
and concentrated ownership. However, corporate governance failures emphasized that 
academics and policymakers should assesses the quality of corporate governance from a 
comprehensive perspective and focus upon multiple corporate governance mechanisms from a 
systemic perspective, because each single governance mechanisms has its own limitions 
which cann‘t meet the needs of the changing environment. Therefore, Black, Jang and Kim 
(2006) examined the effect of corporate governance on financial performance in the Korean 
firms from a wide-ranging perspectives which includes shareholder rights, board structure, 
board procedures and ownership structure. Similarly, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) found that 
good corporate governance is strongly related to the financial performance by testing the 
inter-relationships among corporate ownership structure, CEO–chair separation, board 
independence and stock ownership.  
However, today, the dominant measure to evaluating the quality of corporate governance is to 
construct a composite index because it can comprise multiple dimensions of a firm‘s 
corporate governance structure. Therefore, a large number of scholars and policymakers have 
adopted the corporate governance index to inverstigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. For example, Black (2001) found that there is a strong 
association between a corporate governance index and the firm value in Russian listed 
companies. Black et al. (2006) also found that companies with better corporate governance 
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had better Tobin‘s Q, and indicated that the CLSA corporate governance index increasing by 
10% led to a firm‘s market value increasing by 13.3% , meanwhile, other scholars (Khanna, 
Kogan, & Palepu, 2006; Klapper & Love, 2004) supported similar findings of the positive 
impacts of corporate governance on firm performance based on the CLSA corporate 
governance index. In addition, In addition, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) also 
established a corporate governance index using 24 anti-takeover provisions and indicated that 
the firm with good shareholder rights outperformed the firm with bad shareholder rights. 
Using the corporate governance index as a measure, Core, Guay and Rusticus (2006) 
constructed a corporate governance index based on the code of German corporate governance 
and showed a positive relationship between corporate governance and financial performance 
in German public companies. 
In China, Li (2008) emphasised that the evaluation extent and standards of the quality of 
corporate governance should be changed with different corporate governance environments. 
Therefore, corporate governance evaluation in China will integrate the western successful 
experience in corporate governance into the institutional environment and market conditions 
of Chinese listed company.  
Specifically, with economic reform and corporate governance development, Chinese scholars 
have constructed a corporate governance index from different perspectives that is suitable for 
the China‘ governance environment in order to evaluate the effect of corporate governance on 
the firm performance in Chinese listed companies. For instance, Li et al. (2005) established a 
comprehensive governance evaluation system and constructed a governance index to 
investigate the impact of corporate governance on firm performance, consequently they found 
that there is a strong relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in 
Chinese listed companies. Similarly, Bai (2002) also constructed a corporate governance 
index to reflect the overall level of corporate governance practices in Chinese listed firms and 
emphasized that better-governed firms are associated with higher market valuation. In 
addition, Pan (2004) developed a corporate governance index to assess the quality of 
corporate governance and indicated that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
the quality of corporate governance and financial performance in China.  
However, in previous studies, scholars built the corporate governance index from a certain 
perspectives because they can not incorporate all the governance characteritics into one index, 
therefore, this study will take a different approach  from previous research and establish a 
corporate governance index from the perspectives of ownership structure and board structure 
 58 
to investigate whether corporate governance has an impact on firm performance in Chinese 
listed firms, because the owner structure and board structure are the most mechanisms to 
improve the effectiveness of corporate governance. Furthermore, based on the above 
discussion, this study hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance in Chinese listed firms, so the first hypothesis is:                               
H1: There will be positive relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance in Chinese listed companies. 
3.2 The Moderating Effect of Directors’ Demographic Characteristics on the 
Relationship between Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
As discussed above, research has considered the implication of the impact of corporate 
governance on the firm performance from the perspectives of board structure and ownership 
structure. However, this study will continue to examine the moderating impact of directors‘ 
demographic characteristics on the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance and expect to open a new window to understand what is really going  inside the 
boardroom, and to investigate the nature of the interactions of board members because 
directors‘demographic characteritstics influence corporate governance effectiveness in not 
only fulfilling the key roles of advice for the strategic decision but also monitoring of the 
managers within the framework of governance structure (Forbes & Milliken, 1999). That is, 
this study suggested a theoretical model of interaction effect between directors‘ demographic 
characteristics and corporate governance to bridge some of the gaps that currently influence 
the theorizing about corporate governance.  
Specifically, in China, previous research mainly followed the single path of agency theory and 
focused only on the role of corporate governance structure (such as the board size, 
independent directors and CEO duality) in affecting the effectiveness of corporate governance 
as a result, Chinese scolars did not draw attention to the other critical intervening factors that 
can also influence the relationship between corporate governance structure and firm 
performance. Thus, the study will broaden the focus beyond the role of director monitoring 
and consider theoretical perspectives other than agency theory.  
Meanwhile, Upper echelon theory has also attracted the attention of some Chinese scholars 
because it may provide a theoretical foundation for the effect of directors‘demographic 
characteristics on the association between corporate governance and firm performance in 
Chinese listed firms. Specifically, the theory indicated that the directors‘ demographic 
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characteristics including age, functional track and tenure, are important factors affecting the 
firm performance because they can influence the cognitive biases, interests and values of the 
directors and thus lead to different strategic choices in decision making (D. C. Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984). 
Therefore, as discussed above, corporate governance acts as a system not only to gather and 
analyze information about the interaction between principals and agents, but also to design 
and implement the regulations for coordination among shareholders, board of directors and 
managers (Van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009). Taken together, this study will re-construct 
an intergrated framework between directors‘demographic characteristics, corporate 
governance and firm performance and expect that the directors‘ demographic characteristics 
may have strongly impacts on effectiveness of corporate governance in China. 
Especially after the decades of economic reform, China has gradually transformed from a 
centrally planned into a market economy and established the basic framework of corporate 
governance in the listed firms. However, China adopted alternative ways of the improvement 
of corporate governance compared with those of western countries. Specifically, the 
development of corporate governance not only learn from international institutional 
arrangement which is recognized as ―best practice‖, but also improve the government-
business relationship through transforming state-owned enterprises and establishing the rule 
of law to govern the relationship (Qian & Wu, 2003). Thus, the moderating effect of 
heterogeneity in demographic characteristics may be somewhat different from that in western 
countries.  
To summarize, this study intends to integrate upper echelon theory into the corporate 
governance system in Chinese listed companies, that is, the research will examine the 
interactive effect of directors‘ demographic characteristics and corporate governance on firm 
performance, and then help overcome a current myopia within the research on the corporate 
governance. As a result, this study expects that the integration of the corporate governance 
system and upper echelon theory will not only comprehensively reflect the current condition 
of corporate governance, but also can overcome the theoretical weakness of corporate 
governance. In addition, the interaction effect between directors‘ characteristics and corporate 
governance also can explain why so many previous empirical studies of corporate governance 
and firm performance have yielded mixed or insignificant results in China compared with 
western countries. Next, the following will suggest a series of hypothesis to examine the 
moderating impact of director‘s demographic characteristics.  
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3.2.1 Average Age 
The age of board members has been identified as an important demographic characteristic 
linked to interaction process within members of board and then have a strong impact on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Specifically, as Ryder 
(1965) indicated, age is an important demographic attribute that can influence a person‘s 
background and experiences outside the employing organization and can be used to predict an 
individual‘s non work–related experience. Similarly, Richard and Shelor (2002b) defined age 
as a proxy for perspectives, belief system, network and affiliations. Therefore, some scholars 
indicated that older directors may be more conservative and exhibit better judgement in the 
decision making process because they will take longer to reach decisions, seek greater 
amounts of information and diagnose the value of information more accurately (Daboub, 
Rasheed, Priem, & Gray, 1995; Stevens, Beyer, & Trice, 1978).  
However, other scholars (Gummer, 1986; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) argued that directors‘ 
age has a negative impact on the ability to integrate information in making decisions and 
having confidence in decisions ,because older directors have a psychological commitment to 
the organizational status quo and may be at a point in their lives at which financial security 
and career security are important, as a result, the older directors cannot grasp new ideas and 
learn new behaviours to adapt the change in their environment. 
Furthermore, as some scholars posit (Hambrick, 1984; Menkhoff, 2006), the qualities of 
younger men such as energy, drive and a willingness to accept to change, will be 
advantageous to a company, because younger men can expend more physical and mental 
effort on promoting change and explore the new knowledge to improve firm performance. 
Therefore, younger directors will not only consider that there is more pressure for change and 
innovation than did older directors, but also challenge the existing system and authority more 
than older directors. 
Therefore, average age will influence the cognitive conflict, effort norms and use of 
knowledge in the board process and has different moderating impacts on relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance; overall, the following null hypotheses are 
suggested:      
H2: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the average age of directors is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
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3.2.2 Age Heterogeneity 
As has been discussed above, some scholars suggested that age heterogeneity can increase the 
variety of perspectives and expand the breath of information to enhance the strategic 
decisions, because different age of directors reflects the different cognitive biases and values 
(Richard & Shelor, 2002b; Williams & O'Reilly, 1998). Therefore, heterogeneity in the age of 
the board will affect the interaction process of board members to strength the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. 
However, other scholars argued that age heterogeneity will trigger a variety of attitudes and 
values and could increase the conflict among the members of the board. As a result, greater 
heterogeneity in age will decrease the efficiency of decisions and hinder the effectiveness of 
the interaction within the board (Pfeffer, 1983). On the other hand, scholars (Richard & 
Shelor, 2002b) also explain that directors with  similar ages will have perceptions and 
cognitive biases in common and this can lead them to share the same attitudes and beliefs and 
can improve their communication and cohesion, which leads to building speedy and efficient 
coordination in decision making. Therefore, the homogeneous age of the board will bring 
about more coordination among the board members and ultimately result in improving the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
In sum, scholars have different views on the moderating effect of age heterogeneity on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance; I will adopt the null 
hypothesis concerning the moderating effect of age heterogeneity: 
H3: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the age heterogeneity of directors is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese 
listed companies. 
3.2.3 Functional Heterogeneity 
The functional background has also been identified as an important demographic 
characteristic of the memebers of board, because the members of the board bring his or her 
job orientation that developed from experience in some function and define the problems 
based on the activities and goals of their own areas (D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984). For 
example, as scholars (Eisenhardt, Kahwajy, & Bourgeois, 1998) explain, directors who have 
grown up in sales and marketing see opportunities and issues from vantage points that differ 
from those who have engineering experience.  
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Therefore some scholars suggest that heterogeneity in functional background will improve 
effectiveness of board process and then influence the impact of corproate governance on firm 
performance, because heterogeneity in function is linked to diversity in board members‘ 
knowledge and skills and push directors to consider their strategic decision from a company-
wide perspective (Finkelstein, Hambrick, et al., 2008). For example, Wiersema and Bantel 
(1993) suggested that functional heterogeneity can improve the decision quality through 
increasing the variety and number of  relevant environmental sectors. Similarly, Milliken and 
Martins (1996) found that a functionally diverse team will be better linked into external 
networks and have greater access to information. In addition, Drach and Somech (2001) 
posited that function heterogeneity will facilitate team innovation and creativity.  
On the other hand, other scholars argued that functional heterogeneity will be associated with 
differences of opinion and perspectives and will negatively influence the board interaction 
process and then the effectiveness of corporate governance, because members of the board 
always defined the problem in terms of the activities and goals of their own areas and 
influence the effectiveness of their communication(D. C. Hambrick & Mason, 1984). For 
example, Pelled, Eisenhardt and Xin (1999) found that heterogeneous functional background 
increased the task conflict because director with greater functional heterogeneity held a 
multiple belief structure about a variety of information and led to incongruent task 
perceptions. In addition, Hambrick et al., (1996) indicated that heterogeneity in the function 
of board members will slow an organization‘s speed in executing its actions because disparate 
perspectives and vocabularies in a heterogeneous team will make communication and 
decision making cumbersome. At the same time, they (D. C. Hambrick et al., 1996) also 
found that function heterogeneity is negatively related to the firm‘s response generation speed 
and executive speed because the design, negotiation and elaboration of high-magnitude 
responses from heterogeneous team took much more time than from homogeneous team . 
Therefore, the function heterogeneity will be an important moderator and also has different 
moderating impact on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance; I 
shall again adopt the null hypothesis: 
H4: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the functional heterogeneity is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
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3.2.4 Average Tenure  
The directors‘tenure is viewed as a proxy for directors‘ commitment to the status quo, 
informational diversity and attitudes toward risk and may be the most significant demographic 
variable which can influence the interaction quality of board members (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1990b).Specifically, some scholars noted that there is a positive effect of long-
tenured directors on the interaction quality within the board. First, directors with long tenure 
will facilitate greater social interaction and cohesion because they have spent more time with 
each other to learn how to get along and communicate with each other (K. G. Smith et al., 
1994b). Secondly, long-tenured directors will have a greater shared understanding of their 
organization and industry; that is, they can comprehend the specific idiosyncrasies, strengths 
and weaknesses of their organization and key issues in the industry. Thirdly, longer tenure 
will lead to increased integration and opportunity for shared management values and, in turn, 
will be cohesive and trusting (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; 
K. G. Smith et al., 1994a).  
On the contrary, other scholars indicated that long-tenured directors have a negative impact 
on the quality of the interaction within members of board. First, directors with long tenure 
will resist changing their behaviour and lessen the likelihood that they will challenge the 
status quo because tenure is related to the increased rigidity and commitment to established 
policies and practices (Katz, 1982). Secondly, long tenure will reduce the adoption of unique 
strategies and lead to a lower likelihood of organizational and strategic change and, 
consequently, bring the organization into general conformity with industry tendencies 
(Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990a). Thirdly, directors‘ longevity will lead to increasing 
isolation from outside sources of information and make the firm restrict information 
processing through the establishment of routines for solving the problems, consequently, 
firms cannot develop appropriate strategies to meet environmental challenges (Boeker, 1997).  
Therefore, the average tenure will influence the level of cognitive conflicts, effort norms and 
use of knowledge and skills and then have different moderating effect on the strength between 
corporate governance and firm performance, the following null hypotheses are suggested: 
 H5: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the average tenure is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
 64 
3.2.5 Tenure Heterogeneity 
In addition to average tenure, the heterogeneous tenure also qualifies as an important 
demographic characteristic moderating the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. Specifically, some scholars noted that heterogeneous tenure has a positive 
impact on interaction quality. For example, as Katz (1982) indicated, directors of 
heterogeneous tenure have different attitudes toward an organization and its strategy, as a 
result, they will create more different information collection,understanding and interpretation 
to generate different solution generation and promote organization and strategy change 
(Dutton & Duncan, 1987). Similarly ,Wiersema and Bantel (1992) indicated that the directors 
of  heterogeneous tenure are more open to change because they are more creative and rely on 
a broader set of information and perspectives when making strategy.  
Conversely, other scholars found that heterogeneous tenure have a negative impact on the 
interaction process within members of boards and then on the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. For example, they indicated that tenure heterogeneity will 
produce different interpretion of events and lead to the conflict of communication because 
tenure is regarded as an important determinant of a person‘s communication patterns within 
the group, (Allen & Cohen, 1969a; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). Furthermore, they also 
demonstrated that directors with homogenous tenure will have a single frame of reference, 
which seals them off from portions of the environment and have similar outlooks (Allen & 
Cohen, 1969b; March et al., 1958), and as a result, facilitates communication because group 
tenure similarity will affect the nature and extent of communication in the group  (Campion, 
Medsker, & Higgs, 1993; Wagner, Pfeffer, & O'Reilly Iii, 1984). 
Therefore, tenure heterogeneity may influence the effectiveness of cognitive effects, effort 
norms and use of knowledge and skills in the board process, and strengthen or weaken the 
link between corporate governance and firm performance; overall, I shall adopt the null 
hypothesis: 
H6: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when tenure heterogeneity is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
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3.3 The Research Framework  
A summary of all hypotheses in this study is listed in Fig 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
Figure 3.1 The research framework                                                                                                                                                            
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     Chapter 4 
Sample and Methodology 
The sample in this study is drawn from the Shanghai Stock Exchange index 180 (SSE 180), 
which is a benchmark index that reflects the condition of the Shanghai capital market. The 
SSE 180 was launched in 2002 and selects those listed firms that best represent their 
industry‘s population by size and liquidity. Specifically, the index consists of 180 listed firms 
on the Shanghai stock exchange and is classified into 10 industries based on the Global 
Industry Classification System developed by Morgan Stanley and Standard & Poors (such as 
energy, materials, industrials, consumer discretionary, consumer staples, health care, 
financials, information technology, telecommunication and utilities).By the end of 2005, the 
SSE 180 stocks accounted for 67% of the market capitalization and 53% of the RMB trading 
value of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (Lee, Li, & Wang, 2010).  
This study uses 2004 as the sample base year because that was when the OECD issued the 
revised principles on corporate governance to further improve the concept of corporate 
governance. Thus I attempted to examine all listed firms in SSE index 180 during the period 
2004 to 2008. A complete review of the prospectuses and annual reports found that only 155 
of the listed firms had complete information about board size, block shareholders‘ holding, 
independent directors‘ ratio, CEO duality, directors‘ ages, directors‘ functional track and 
directors‘ tenure.  This resulted in a sample of 684 annual observations for the period 2004 to 
2008.   
4.1 Independent Variables 
4.1.1 CG Index: 
As disussed above, board structure and ownership structure are regarded as the central control 
mechanisms for monitoring the behaviour of managers and are good prxies for overall good 
governance, therefore, instead of considering a single measures, this study considers four 
differenrent measures of corporate governace, and constructs the corporate governance index 
(CG index) to assess whether the overall corporate governance impacts the firm performance 
from the board structure and ownership structure. That is, this study will take a different 
approach from previous research and construct a Chinese Corporate Governance Index based 
primarily on the listed firms of the SSE index 180 during 2004 to 2008 in order to investigate 
the relationship between the financial performance and corporate governance index. 
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Specifically, according to the OECD governance principles, the main purpose of corporate 
governance is to monitor the senior managers and to protect the minority shareholders. In this 
research, I use the independent directors and block shareholders‘ holdings as measures to 
protect the minority shareholders. In addition, I also apply board size and CEO duality as 
measures to control the managers. Thus the study considers four characteristics of corporate 
governance including board size, independent director ratio, CEO duality and block 
shareholders‘ holding, and construct a corporate governance index from the perspectives of 
board of directors and ownership structure. Finally, I make the indicator variable equal to one 
if an individual governance characteristic is presumed to strengthen the firm performance, 
zero otherwise. As a consequence, the governance index is the sum of the four indicators in 
the range of zero to four, and can be used as proxy to assess the quality of corporate 
governance of the firm. That is, firms with governance index of zero are presumed to have a 
weaker governance system, leading to decreased firm value, conversely, firms with an index 
of four are presumed to have a stronger governance system, leading to increased firm value. 
4.1.2 Board Size Indicator (Sub_Index A) 
The board size indicator refers to the number of directors on the board. As discussed above, 
there are arguments for an impact of board size on firm performance. For example, some 
scholars (S. Cheng, 2008; T. Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998b; Yermack, 1995) 
indicated that a small board will positively affect the firm value because small boards are 
more effective than large board. Conversely, others scholars (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2009; 
Dalton et al., 1999) argued that large boards can increase the firm value because they can 
provide high quality of advice for strategic decisions. Thus it is difficult to determine the 
optimum size of the board of directors. In China, Qu (2007b) and Yu (2004a) found a reverse 
U-shaped relationship between board size and financial performance and suggested that 
neither very small boards nor very larger boards are optimal for Chinese listed firms. That is, 
their results indicated a positive impact of board size in the range nine to eleven members on 
firm performance. Therefore, indicator equals 1 for firms with a board size ranging from nine 
to eleven, zero otherwise (see Table 4.1). 
4.1.3 Independent Director Ratio Indicator (Sub_Index B) 
The independent director ratio refers to the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Scholars recommend that a firm should increase its proportion of independent directors on the 
board because independent directors can strengthen the independence of boards to protect the 
interests of minority shareholders (B. D. Baysinger & Butler, 1985a; Bozec & Dia, 2007). In 
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China, the government also emphasized the growing importance of independent directors 
during recent decade. For example, the CSRC released the guidelines for the establishment of 
the independent director system in listed firms. In addition, scholars (Choa & Ruib, 2009; 
Peng, 2004) also argued that there is a relationship between independent director ratio and 
financial performance in Chinese listed firms. Thus, I define the independent director ratio 
indicator equal to one if the proportion of independent directors on the board is higher than 
the legal requirement (33%), zero otherwise (see Table 4.1), because the proportion of 
independent directors must be over 33% in listed firms in terms of the regulation issued by the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission.  
4.1.4 Block Shareholders’ holding Indicator (Sub_Index C) 
A block shareholder is defined as shareholders who hold 5% or more of the outstanding 
shares. The research will investigate how the total fraction of shares owned by the block 
shareholders affects financial performance in China. As discussed above, there is a positive 
relationship between the ownership concentration and financial performance because China is 
an emerging and transitional economy with a low level of investor protection (La Porta et al., 
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997a). Furthermore, according the securities law of the P.R.C., 
where an investor has attained a 30% shareholding in a listed company, the investor shall 
make an offer to all shareholders of the listed company in accordance with the provisions of 
the law for a complete or partial acquisition of shares of the listed company. Therefore, I 
define the block shareholders‘ holding indicator equal to one if the total ownership of all 
block shareholders is larger than 30%, zero otherwise (see Table 4.1). 
4.1.5 CEO Duality Indicator (Sub_Index D) 
CEO duality refers to the CEO also serving as the chairman of the board. Some scholars 
indicated that firms should split the jobs of CEO and the chairman because the separation of 
CEO and chairman can facilitate monitoring and control of the behaviour of the CEO 
(Perrow, 1993). However, other scholars argue that companies without CEO duality can make 
better and faster decisions and do better than those which split the two positions because the 
CEO duality cannot establish strong leadership, leads to inefficiencies through unity of 
command and increases the conflict between CEO and chairman (J. R. Galbraith, 1973; 
Perrow, 1993). Furthermore, Palmon and Wald (2002) developed an integrated view on the 
impact of the CEO duality and found that small firms can benefit from the clarity and 
decisiveness of decision making under a single executive and large firms can take advantage 
of the checks and balances of having two executives in the CEO and chairman positions. In 
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the research, the firm will be defined as a large firm when the firm size is larger than the mean 
size of the sample; otherwise I will define a firm as a small firm when its size is smaller than 
the mean size of the sample. The firm size is measured by the natural log of the total assets of 
each fiscal year-end; a firm is defined to be large if its log of assets is greater than the mean of 
log of total assets of the sample. Therefore, CEO duality indicator equals one for small firms 
with CEO duality, zero otherwise. In contrast, the indicator equals zero for large firm with 
CEO duality, one otherwise (see Table 4.1).   
Therefore, the corporate governance index is the sum of the four governance indicators with a 
range from 0 to 4; the study refers to the corporate governance index as ―CGI‖. 
Corporate Governance Index “CGI” = Board size indicator + Independent director ratio 
indicator + Block shareholders’ holding indicator+ CEO duality indicator. 
 
Table 4.1  Definition of Corporate Governance Indicators 
Indicators Definitions 
Board size 
indicator 
Number of directors on the board 
Indicator equals one for firms with board size ranging from nine to eleven; 
zero otherwise. 
Independent 
director ratio 
indicator 
Proportion of independent directors on the board 
Indicator equals one if proportion of independent director on the board is 
higher than the legal requirement (33%); zero otherwise. 
Block 
shareholders‘ 
holding indicator 
A block shareholder is defined as a shareholder who holds 5% or more of 
the outstanding shares 
Indicator equals one if total ownership of all block shareholders is larger 
than 30%, zero otherwise. 
CEO duality 
indicator 
CEO duality refer to CEO also serving as the chairman/chairwoman of the 
board 
Indicator equals one for small firms with CEO duality, zero otherwise.  
Indicator equals zero for large firms with CEO duality, one otherwise. 
 
4.2 Moderating Variables  
The moderating variables are age heterogeneity of directors, functional heterogeneity of 
directors, average tenure of directors and tenure heterogeneity of directors. 
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4.2.1 Average Age: 
The demographic trait of age will moderate the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. In the research, Average age is measured by the mean of the age of the 
directors on the board.  
4.2.2 Age Heterogeneity: 
Age heterogeneity is measured by using the coefficient of variation in the age of the members 
on the board (standard deviation divided by the mean), because the coefficient of variation is 
the best way to measure interval –level data such as age and tenure  (Allison, 1978).   
4.2.3 Functional Heterogeneity: 
Functional experience of the members in the boards is defined as the area in which directors 
have most experience and is measured by the number of years spent by the director in this 
area. In this research, functional experience is categorized into six tracks: 1) general 
management; 2) law; 3) finance and accountant; 4) civil service; 5) public service; and 6) 
academic consulting. Because functional experience is a categorical variable, functional 
diversity is measured using Blau‘s heterogeneity index (Blau, 1977) in the following way: 
H=1-∑Pi
2    
Pi: is the proportion of the directors in each category i. 
i: takes the value one to six representing the diverse functional experience 
Therefore, the H index will vary from zero to one, where values close to one show that 
functional heterogeneity is higher among board members; in contrast, values close to zero 
shows that directors on the board are dominated by one function. 
4.2.4 Average Tenure: 
Director tenure refers to the number of years the directors have held the director position on 
the board. The average director‘s tenure is the mean of the tenure of the directors on the 
board.  
4.2.5 Tenure Heterogeneity:  
Because tenure is also interval–level data, I applied the coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation divided by the mean) to measure the tenure heterogeneity. 
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4.3 Dependent Variables  
The research uses two widely used finance measures, ROE (net income divided by 
owners‘equity) and profit margin (net income divided by revenue) for two reasons. First, 
ROE is adopted as an important factor to assess the financial performance in China. For 
instance, CSRC announced the regulation to require listed firms‘ ROE to be less than 10% in 
each of the three most recent years if the listed firm wants to receive the proceedings through 
the secondary offering. In addition, SASAC also applies the ROE as an important measure to 
evaluate the top management team‘s performance. Operationally, the ROE is measured by 
using net income divided by the owners‘ equity during a given year. The research also uses a 
second measure, profit margin (profits divided by revenue), to strength the construct of firm 
performance.  
Secondly, the capital market in China was established at the end of last century and is not yet 
well developed, thus a volatile market-measure such as share price can not reflect the firm‘s 
true value. For example, according to the statistics report issued by National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, the real GDP growth rose 9% in 2008 and 8.7% in 2009, that is, China‘s 
economy has grown significantly during the period 2008 to 2009 as a result of the economic 
stimulation policy.  However, at the same time, the Shanghai stock composite index started to 
go down gradually and fell below 1900 points in September 2008, which was about 70% 
below the high of 6124 points recorded on October 16, 2007 (Lai & Yang, 2009). In addition, 
Xu (2010) indicated that the China stock market index displayed the characteristics of excess 
fluctuation on the base of the stock index during the period 1993 to 2008. Some other scholars 
suggested that the turnover ratios of the Chinese capital market are 700-1000%, which 
indicated that the capital market is a highly speculative market (Pistor & Xu, 2005). Therefore 
market-based measures will be less informationally efficient and will not be adopted in this 
study (Tenev, Zhang, & Brefort, 2002). Finally, these two performance measures have been 
adopted to evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance in the previous studies in China 
(Li, 2008; Peng, 2004); therefore  I can use them to compare my empirical result with 
previous research. 
4.4 Control Variables 
There are some other variables that can affect the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance, thus these variables should be controlled in the research. 
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Firm size  
The size of firm is an important factor affecting firm performance. For instance, Jung (1991) 
indicated that there is a positive relationship between firm size and firm performance. In 
addition, other scholars also suggested that firm size has a significant impact on financial 
performance and should be included as a control variable (Cheung, Jiang, Limpaphayom, & 
Lu, 2010; Johnson et al., 1993; Peng, 2004). The research will use the natural log of firm 
assets to measure firm size. 
Leverage ratio (Debt/Assets) 
Leverage is regarded as an important factor influencing firm performance. For example, Lang 
et al. (1996) found that leverage can affect firm growth. Moreover, some scholars indicated 
that leverage should be included as a control variable because leverage can influence firm 
value (Tallman & Li, 1996; Zahra, 1995). Leverage will be measured using the debt/asset 
ratio in this research. 
4.5 Methods 
To investigate the relationship between the corporate governance index and firm performance, 
the research will use a standardized regression model to examine autocorrelation in data 
pooled during the period 2004 to 2008. 
I examine hypotheses two to six to determine whether or not there are interactions between 
the corporate governance index and the characteristics of directors on boards in China; they 
will be tested by the hierarchical regression analysis. That is, the analysis first enters the 
control variables, then the independent variables, and then the interaction terms (Zahra, 1996). 
Specifically, the control variable was entered as one block in the first step, the independent 
variables (corporate governance index) and the moderating variables (average age, age 
heterogeneity, function heterogeneity, tenure heterogeneity and average tenure) were entered 
as one block in the second step. Finally, after centering the independent variables and 
moderating variables separately, the interaction effect of the independent variables and 
moderating variables (corporate governance * the director‘s demographic characteristic) were 
entered in one block in the third step. For instance, in order to examine the moderating role of 
average age on the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance, in 
the first step, the control variable (log asset) was entered in block one, then the control 
variable (log asset), the independent variables (corporate governance index) and moderating 
 73 
variables (average age) were entered in block two in the second step and, finally, the control 
variable (log asset), independent variables, moderating variables and interaction effect of 
independent variables & moderating variable (corporate governance * average age) in block 
three in the third step. 
Table 4.2 Summary of Regression Variables  
Variables Definition and Meaning 
Dependent  
variables 
 
ROE Net income divided by owners‘equity 
Profit  Margin Net income divided by revenue 
Independent 
variables  
 
Corporate 
Governance Index  
Corporate Governance Index ―CGI‖ = Board size indicator + 
Independent director ratio indicator + Block shareholders‘ holding 
indicator+ CEO duality indicator. 
Moderating 
variables 
 
Average Age Mean of the age of the directors on the board 
Age Heterogeneity Coefficient of variation(standard deviation divided by the mean) 
Functional 
Heterogeneity 
Blau‘s heterogeneity index H=1-∑Pi
2 
Average Tenure Mean of the tenure of the director on the board 
Tenure 
heterogeneity 
Coefficient of variation(standard deviation divided by the mean) 
Control variables  
Leverage Debt divided by asset 
Firm size Natural log of firm assets 
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     Chapter 5                                                                                          
Results and Findings 
This chapter describes the empirical results of the hypotheses testing proposed in above 
chapter. That is, after presenting the descriptive statistics of the sample of the 684 company-
years in this study, the results of the various hypotheses will be presented. 
Table 5.1 shows the minimum, maximum, means and standard deviations among all variables 
including dependent variables, independent variables and control variables included in this 
study.  
Table 5.1  Descriptive Statistics  
Feature  N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std 
Deviation 
ROE 684 -0.39 0.95 0.13 0.12 
Profit margin 684 -0.38 1.52 0.12 0.13 
Board Size Indicator 684 0.00 1.00 0.63 0.48 
Independent Director Ratio 
Indicator 684 0.00 1.00 0.88 0.32 
Block Shareholders‘ holding 
Indicator 684 0.00 1.00 0.90 0.31 
CEO Duality Indicator 684 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.50 
Corporate Governance  
Index(CGI) 684 1.00 4.00 2.89 0.85 
Average Age 684 40.71 61.67 50.58 3.91 
Age Heterogeneity 684 0.06 0.34 0.16 0.04 
Functional Heterogeneity 684 0.20 0.73 0.51 0.10 
Tenure Heterogeneity 684 0.00 1.41 0.46 0.24 
Average Tenure 684 1.00 9.36 4.01 1.42 
Log Assets 684 8.71 12.08 9.91 0.54 
Debt/assets 684 0.03 0.96 0.51 0.17 
Valid N (list wise) 684         
The appendix table 1 presents the correlations for all the variables used in this study. The 
results of the correlation among the demographic variables suggested that they can be 
included in one regression model. Therefore, multicollinearity was not a problem in this 
study. 
As discussed above, I used the OLS regression and the hierarchical regression analysis to test 
these hypotheses. Tables 5.3-5.14 present all regression results for the effect of corporate 
governance on financial performance and the moderating impact of directors‘ demographic 
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heterogenity. More specifically, these tables not only show the effect of corporate governance 
on the performance measured by ROE and profit margin separately, but also indicate the 
moderating effects of directors‘ demographic heterogeneity on the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance.  
5.1 The Effect of Corporate Governance on Firm Performance in Chinese listed 
companies 
H1: There will be positive relationship between firm performance and corporate 
governance in Chinese listed companies. 
From the perspective of ownership and leadership, this study empirically tests the effects of 
the corporate governance mechanisms on the financial performance in Chinese listed 
companies. I used two different measures of firm performance, namely return on equity 
(ROE) and profit margin (net income/revenue), as dependent variables; at the same time, the 
independent variables include the five corporate governance variables, board size indicator, 
independent director ratio indicator, block holders‘ holding indicator, CEO duality indicator 
and corporate governance index, together with firm size and leverage ratio as control 
variables.  
Table 5.2 presents the summary statistics of the corporate governance index and the four sub-
indices. I found that there are significant improvements in the corporate governance index of 
Chinese listed firms during the period 2004-2008, the potential reason is that Chinese listed 
companies have established the corporate governance framework with Chinese characteristics 
to adapt to the development environment and economic situation, based on the OECD 
principles of corporate governance and the requirements set out by Chinese government. That 
is, since 2004, a seriese of policies and regulations which aim to strength the effectiveness of 
corproate governance has been introduced by government or government authorized 
organizations and have been acknowledged by the listed companies. For instances, according 
to the requirement for the independent directors, the Chinese listed companies have gradually 
restructure their board composition to strength the independence of board of directors. As a 
result, it appears that these Chinese listed firms have made significant progress with respect to 
quality of corporate governance. 
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Table 5.2  Summary of Corporate Governance Index 
Year  Variable  No. of obs. Min. Max. Mean S.D. 
2004 Board Size Indicator 121 0 1 0.6 0.491 
  Independent Director Ratio Indicator 121 0 1 0.85 0.357 
  Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator 121 0 1 0.96 0.2 
  CEO Duality Indicator 121 0 1 0.55 0.5 
  CGI 121 1 4 2.96 0.8 
2005 Board Size Indicator 121 0 1 0.64 0.481 
  Independent Director Ratio Indicator 121 0 1 0.88 0.331 
  Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator 121 0 1 0.95 0.218 
  CEO Duality Indicator 121 0 1 0.54 0.501 
  CGI 121 1 4 3.01 0.851 
2006 Board Size Indicator 137 0 1 0.64 0.481 
  Independent Director Ratio Indicator 137 0 1 0.9 0.304 
  Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator 137 0 1 0.85 0.354 
  CEO Duality Indicator 137 0 1 0.45 0.5 
  CGI 137 1 4 2.85 0.907 
2007 Board Size Indicator 151 0 1 0.63 0.485 
  Independent Director Ratio Indicator 151 0 1 0.9 0.3 
  Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator 151 0 1 0.87 0.34 
  CEO Duality Indicator 151 0 1 0.45 0.499 
  CGI 151 1 4 2.85 0.839 
2008 Board Size Indicator 154 0 1 0.61 0.489 
  Independent Director Ratio Indicator 154 0 1 0.88 0.322 
  Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator 154 0 1 0.87 0.337 
  CEO Duality Indicator 154 0 1 0.47 0.501 
  CGI 154 1 4 2.84 0.836 
Table 5.3 and 5.4 report the regressions result of corporate governance on firm performance. 
Model 2 in the table shows a mixed relationship between the sub-indexes of corporate 
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governance and financial performance measured by return on equity (ROE). Specifically, the 
ROE is significantly positively related to the board size indicator (coefficient = 0.026, t-
value=-2.684), and the block shareholders‘ holding indicator (coefficient=0.035, t-
value=2.29). However, the independent director ratio indicator (coefficient=-0.001, t-
value=0.086) is non-significantly negatively related to the ROE, CEO duality 
(coefficient=0.002, t-value=-0.139) is non-significantly positively related to the ROE.  
Model 2 in Table 5.4 also indicated mixed effects of the sub-indexes of corporate governance 
on the performance measured by profit margin. Specifically, the profit margin is significantly 
positively associated with the block shareholders‘ holding indicator (coefficient=0.028, t-
value=1.831). However, the board size indicator (coefficient=0.001, t-value =0.124), the 
independent director (coefficient=0.013, t-value=0.88) and the CEO duality indicator 
(coefficient=0.006, t-value=0.565) are positively but non-significantly related to performance. 
Table 5.3  The results of regression analysis of the sub-indexes and the corporate  
                  governance index  
 
Variables Dependent Variable: ROE 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model3 
Intercept  -0.015  -0.061 -0.002 
  (-0.185)  (-0.612) (-0.026) 
Board Size Indicator   0.026***   
    (-2.684)   
Independent Director Ratio Indicator   -0.001   
    (-0.086)   
Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator   0.035**   
    (-2.29)   
CEO Duality Indicator   0.002   
    (-0.139)   
Corporate governance index(CGI)     0.016*** 
      (-2.871) 
Log Assets 0.019** 0.019* 0.014 
  (2.311) (-1.89) (-1.583) 
Debt/assets -0.103*** -0.097*** -0.104*** 
  (-3.734) (-3.505) (-3.794) 
 R Square  0.024 0.044 0.036 
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Table 5.4  The result of regression analysis of sub-indexes and the corporate governance   
                  
                   Index  
 
Variables Dependent Variable: Profit Margin 
 Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept  0.048 0.047 0.055 
  (0.569) (0.463) (0.662) 
Board Size Indicator   0.001   
    (0.124)   
Independent Director Ratio Indicator   0.013   
    (0.88)   
Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator   0.028*   
    (1.831)   
CEO Duality Indicator   0.006   
    (0.565)   
Corporate governance index(CGI)     0.009* 
      (1.675) 
Log Assets 0.024 0.02** 0.021** 
  (2.859) (1.962) (2.389) 
Debt/assets -0.332 -0.329*** 0.333 
  (-11.967) (-11.743) (-12.005) 
 R Square 0.175 0.181 0.178 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
As discussed above, the corporate governance index is a composite measure and can reflect 
the overall quality of a company‘s governance from the perspective of ownership structure 
and board structure. Model 3 in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 analyses the effect of corporate 
governance index on firm performance. The results show that the corporate governance index 
significantly positively affects the financial performance as measured by return on equity 
(coefficient=0.016, t-value=2.871) and profit margin (coefficient=0.009, t-value=1.675). Thus 
Hypothesis H1 received strong support, that is, the result found that there is an effective 
impact of corporate governance on the performance of Chinese listed companies. 
In addition, Model 1 in table 5.3 and 5.4 also shows the effectiveness of the two control 
variables, firm size is positively and significantly correlated with financial performance as 
measured by ROE and profit margin. Similarly, the results show that the leverage ratio is 
positively and significantly related to financial performance as measured by ROE and profit 
margin. 
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5.2 The Moderating Effects of Directors’ Demographic Characteristics   
The research uses demographic characteristics of directors as moderator to test whether 
directors‘demographic characteritics can moderate the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. More specifically, directors‘demographic characteristics 
that serve as the moderator between corporate governance and financial performance and 
include average age, age heterogeneity, functional heterogeneity, average tenure and tenure 
heterogeneity, together with firm size and leverage ratio as control variables. As mentioned 
above, this study also adopted ROE and profit margin as measures of firm financial 
performance. 
In order to test the hypotheses examining whether director diversity is a moderator of the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, I used hierarchical 
regression analysis. Meanwhile, I examined the change in variance which is explained by R 
square change to validate the interactions. The following tables report the results from a series 
of hierarchical regressions.  
5.2.1 Interaction Effect between Average Age and Corporate Governance on Firm 
Performance 
H2: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the average age of directors is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
This hypothesis investigated whether the average age of directors moderated the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Average age was measured using the 
mean age for directors in Chinese listed companies, the performance was measured using 
return on assets, and then the study used the average age as moderator between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The results as summarized in Table 5.5 suggests that there 
is a statistically significant (t-value=-1.812) and negative (coefficient=-0.002) interaction 
between average age and corporate governance index. Thus, hypothesis H2 is supported.  
Similarly, using profit margin as a proxy for financial performance for the period 2004 to 
2008, the research examined the moderating effect of average age. Table 5.6 shows that 
average age reduces the strength of the positive relationship between the corporate 
governance index and financial performance (coefficient=-0.002, t-value=-1.735), thus, 
hypothesis H2 was again supported. 
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Table 5.5  Moderated Regression Analysis Results:Average Age as a Moderator. 
                               Variables                    Dependent Variable: ROE 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept -0.015 0.002 -0.005 
  (-0.185) (-0.027) (-0.06) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.016*** 0.015*** 
    (-2.875) (-2.839) 
Average age   0.0002 0.0004 
    (-0.186) (-0.274) 
Average age * CGI     -0.002* 
      (-1.812) 
Log Assets 0.019** -0.015 0.016 
  (2.311) (-1.489) (-1.646) 
Debt/assets -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.105*** 
  (-3.734) (-3.751) (-3.774) 
R Square  0.024 0.036 0.041 
R Square change     0.005 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Table 5.6   Moderated Regression Analysis Result: Average Age as a Moderator 
Variables Dependent Variable: Profit Margin 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept 0.048 -0.001 -0.008 
  (0.569) (-0.008) (-0.009) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.008 0.008 
    (-1.521) (-1.485) 
Average age   0.003** 0.003** 
    (-2.313) (-2.229) 
Average age * CGI     -0.002* 
      (-1.735) 
Log Assets 0.024*** 0.01 0.012 
  (2.859) (-1.061) (-1.211) 
Debt/assets -0.332*** -0.32*** -0.32*** 
  (-11.967) (-11.324) (-11.357) 
R Square  0.175 0.185 0.188 
R Square change     0.003 
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5.2.2 Interaction Effect between Age Heterogeneity and Corporate Governance on 
Firm Performance 
H3: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the age heterogeneity of directors is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese 
listed companies. 
Table 5.7 and 5.8 presented that age heterogeneity moderates the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. this study used the coefficient of variation as a 
proxy to assess the degree of age heterogeneity and ROE as proxy to evaluate the firm 
performance, Model 3 in Table 5.7 shows that there is a statistically insignificant (t-
value=0.449) positive (coefficient=0.054) interaction between age heterogeneity and 
corporate governance. The result does not support hypothesis. 
Similarly, using profit margin as a proxy to assess the financial performance in Chinese listed 
companies, the research investigated the moderating effect of age heterogeneity. Model 3 in 
Table 5.8 shows that age heterogeneity increased the strength of the positive relationship 
between the corporate governance index and performance (coefficient=0.207, t-value= 1.719), 
the hypothesis H3 was not accepted.   
Table 5.7   Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Age Heterogeneity as a Moderator. 
Variable Dependent Variable: ROE 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept -0.015 0.027 0.026 
  (-0.185) (0.316) (0.305) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.016*** 0.016*** 
    (2.899) (2.857) 
Age Heterogeneity   -0.132 -0.136 
    (-1.285) (-1.314) 
Age Heterogeneity * CGI     0.054 
      (0.449) 
Log Assets 0.019** 0.013 0.013 
  (2.311) (1.493) (1.516) 
Debt/assets -0.103*** -0.106*** -0.107*** 
  (-3.734) (-3.864) (-3.878) 
R Square  0.024 0.038 0.039 
R Square change     0.001 
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Table 5.8   Moderated Regression Analysis Result: Age Heterogeneity as a Moderator. 
Variable Dependent Variable: Profit Margin 
  Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept 0.048 0.083 0.08 
  (0.569) (0.961) (0.923) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.009* 0.009 
    (1.7) (1.576) 
Age Heterogeneity   -0.127 -0.14 
    (-1.216) (-1.343) 
Age Heterogeneity * CGI     0.207* 
      (1.719) 
Log Assets 0.024*** 0.02** 0.021** 
  (2.859) (2.302) (2.401) 
Debt/assets -0.332*** -0.335*** -0.337*** 
  (-11.967) (-12.059) (-12.145) 
R Square  0.175 0.18 0.184 
R Square change     0.004 
Note: ***, **and* represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and10% respectively 
5.2.3 Interaction Effect between Functional Heterogeneity and Corporate Governance 
on Firm Performance 
H4: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the functional heterogeneity is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Table 5.9 and 5.10 presented the regression results for the moderating effect of functional 
heterogeneity on the relationship between corporate governance and performance; Blau‘s 
index was used to measure the degree of function heterogeneity. Using ROE as a proxy to 
measure the financial performance in Chinese listed companies, Model 3 in Table 5.9 showed 
that function heterogeneity negatively (coefficient=-0.128) and significantly( t-value=-2.141) 
moderated the effectiveness of corporate governance to improve financial performance in 
China. Thus, Hypothesis H4 was supported. Similarly, the research used the profit margin as a 
proxy to measure the financial performance and tested the interaction effect between 
corporate governance and function heterogeneity on firm performance. Model 3 in Table 5.10 
indicated that the interaction between function heterogeneity and corporate governance is 
negative (coefficient=-0.005, t-value=-0.818), but not significant. 
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Table 5.9   Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Functional Heterogeneity as a 
Moderator. 
                                   Variable Dependent Variable: ROE 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept -0.015 0.065 0.044 
  (-0.185) (0.773) (0.522) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.015*** 0.015*** 
    (2.713) (2.757) 
Functional  heterogeneity   -0.147*** -0.144*** 
    (-3.291) (-3.224) 
Functional  heterogeneity*CGI     -0.128** 
      (-2.141) 
Log Assets 0.019** 0.015* 0.017* 
  (2.311) (1.741) (1.943) 
Debt/assets -0.103*** -0.107*** -0.106*** 
  (-3.734) (-3.948) (-3.896) 
R Square   0.024 0.051 0.058 
R Square change      0.007 
 
Table 5.10   Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Function Heterogeneity as a 
Moderator. 
Variables Dependent Variable: Profit Margin 
 Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept 0.048 0.08 0.072 
 (0.569) (0.927) (0.825) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.009 0.009 
   (1.611) (1.624) 
Functional heterogeneity   -0.053 -0.052 
   (-1.171) (-1.142) 
Functional  heterogeneity*CGI     -0.005 
     (-0.818) 
Log Assets 0.024*** 0.021** 0.022** 
 (2.859) (2.44) (2.507) 
Debt/assets -0.332*** -0.334*** -0.33*** 
 (-11.967) (-12.045) (-12.014) 
R Square 0.175 0.18 0.181 
R Square change     0.001 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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5.2.4 Interaction Effect between Average Tenure and Corporate Governance on Firm 
Performance 
H5: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the average tenure is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Using return on equity as a proxy to measure the performance, this study examined the 
moderating effect of average tenure on the relationship between corporate governance and 
firm performance. Model 3 in Table 5.11 presented the regression result for this hypothesis 
and indicated that the interaction between corporate governance and average tenure has a non-
sifgnificantly positive impact on financial performance in Chinese listed companies. Thus, 
this hypothesis was not supported.  
Similarly, using profit margin as a proxy to measure the performance, this hypothesis 
predicted that average tenure will moderate the relationship between corporate governance 
and performance. However, the results (see Table 5.12) showed a negative (coefficient=-
0.011) and significant (t-value=-2.92) moderating effect of average tenure on the relationship 
between corporate governance and firm performance. That is, the result indicateded that 
average tenure reduces the strength of the positive relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. Thus the hypothesis H5 is acceptable.  
Table 5.11  Moderated Regression Analysis Result:Average Tenure as a Moderator. 
Variable Dependent Variable: ROE 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept -0.015 0.003 0.003 
  (-0.185) (0.031) (0.036) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.015*** 0.016*** 
    (2.828) (2.81) 
Average tenure   -0.002 -0.002 
    (-0.538) (-0.523) 
Average tenure* CGI     0.0004 
      (-0.117) 
Log Assets 0.019** 0.014 0.014 
  (2.311) (1.609) (1.592) 
Debt/assets -0.103*** -0.104*** -0.104*** 
  (-3.734) (-3.786) (-3.784) 
R Square  0.024 0.037 0.037 
R Square change     0 
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Table 5.12  Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Average Tenure as a Moderator. 
Variables Dependent Variables: Profit Margin 
  Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept 0.048 0.069 0.08 
  (0.569) (0.824) (0.956) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.009 0.011** 
    (1.57) (2.012) 
Average tenure   -0.005 -0.004 
    (-1.56) (-1.26) 
Average tenure* CGI     -0.011*** 
      (-2.92) 
Log Assets 0.024*** 0.022** 0.019** 
  (2.859) (2.474) (2.223) 
Debt/assets -0.332*** -0.332*** -0.333*** 
  (-11.967) (-12) (-12.094) 
R Square  0.175 0.181 0.191 
R Square change     0.01 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
5.2.5 Interaction Effect between Tenure Heterogeneity and Corporate Governance on 
Firm Performance 
H6: The relationship between corporate governance and firm performance is not stronger 
when the tenure heterogeneity is higher as opposed to when it is lower in Chinese listed 
companies. 
Using the coefficient of variation as a proxy to measure the tenure heterogeneity, this study 
examined whether tenure heterogeneity moderated the relationship between corporate 
governance and performance measured by the return on equity. The results as summarized in 
Table 5.13 indicateded that there is statistically significant (t-value=-1.71) and negative 
(coefficient=-0.038) interaction between corporate governance and tenure heterogeneity. 
Similarly, in order to determine the direction of the hypothesis relationships, this study also 
conducted the regression analyses with an interaction between corporate governance and 
tenure heterogeneity using profit margin as a measure of performance. Model 3 in the Table 
5.14 indicated that the tenure heterogeneity negatively (coefficient=-0.043) and significantly 
(t-value=-1.916) moderates the effectiveness of corporate governance on performance; thus, 
hypothesis H6 was supported. 
 
 86 
Table 5.13  Moderated Regression Analysis Results:Tenure Heterogeneity as a 
Moderator. 
Variable Dependent Variable: ROE 
  Model1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept -0.015 0.006 0.009 
  (-0.185) (0.072) (0.106) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.015*** 0.016*** 
    (2.841) (2.906) 
Tenure heterogeneity   -0.014 -0.016 
    (-0.775) (-0.843) 
Tenure heterogeneity* CGI     -0.038* 
      (-1.71) 
Log Assets 0.019** 0.014 0.013 
  (2.311) (1.577) (1.525) 
Debt/assets -0.103*** -0.105*** -0.103*** 
  (-3.734) (-3.828) (-3.756) 
R Square   0.024 0.037 0.041 
R Square change     0.004 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
Table 5.14  Moderated Regression Analysis Results: Tenure Heterogeneity as a 
Moderator. 
Variable Dependent Variable: Profit Margin 
  Model 1 Model2 Model3 
Intercept 0.048 0.065 0.069 
  (0.569) (0.777) (0.817) 
Corporate governance index(CGI)   0.009 0.009* 
    (1.639) (1.712) 
Tenure heterogeneity   -0.018 -0.019 
    (-0.959) (-1.035) 
Tenure heterogeneity* CGI     -0.043* 
      (-1.916) 
Log Assets 0.024*** 0.021** 0.02** 
  (2.859) (2.383) (2.326) 
Debt/assets -0.332*** -0.334*** -0.332*** 
  (-11.967) (-12.038) (-11.967) 
R Square   0.175 0.179 0.184 
R Square change     0.005 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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     Chapter 6 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The current turmoil in financial markets is regarded as the most serious crisis since the Great 
Depression and leads some scholars and policy makers to re-examine the weakness or failure 
of corporate governance from a comprehensive perspectives. However, as Cha (2001) 
indicated, we must recognize that the promulgation of more rules and regulations alone would 
not be sufficient to improve the quality of corporate governance. Therefore, the financial 
crisis encourages us to think about the improvement of the relationship between corporate 
governance and financial performance in a new way and reminds us to take new steps to 
allow corporate governance to return to effectiveness and efficiency.  
Hence, based on a sample of 155 listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, this study has 
constructed a corporate governance index from the perspectives of ownership structure and 
board characteristics to empirically examine the relationship between corporate governance 
and financial performance. Furthermore the research investigated an integrated model that 
takes into account the moderating role of directors‘demographic characteristics in corproate 
governance practices and assessed the interactive effects of corporate governance and 
directors‘ demographic characteristics on financial performance in Chinese listed companies. 
First, the results are consistent with those of western research and indicated that the 
association between corporate governance and financial performance is a significantly 
positive in China. Second, the findings suggest that heterogeneity of directors‘demographic 
characteristics can play an important moderating role in the link between corporate 
governance and financial performance.   
To sum up, the empirical evidences show some interesting results regarding the effectiveness 
of corporate governance and the moderating role of the directors‘demographic characteristics. 
This section will discuss the findings in detail as well as their implications for academic 
research and for practitioners. 
6.1 Corporate Governance  
First, this study explored the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance in Chinese listed firms, and hypothesized a significant positive relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. Thus, the research combined 
ownership structure and board structure into a corporate governance index to evaluate the 
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quality of corporate governance and found that the hypothesis is supported in Chinese listed 
companies. That is, my findings indicate that there is a positive and significant association 
between good corporate governance and financial performance in Chinese listed firms. 
Secondly, the governance index in this research is consisted of four indicators: board size, 
independent director ratio, block shareholders‘ holding and CEO duality, however, the study 
found that these governance indicators have different effects on financial performance in 
China compared with those in developed countries. Therefore, the findings shed the light on 
the competing interpretations of the academic community and suggested that differences in 
corporate governance structure should reflect the trade-off between the benefits of increasing 
monitoring and the costs of such monitoring. In addition, the results should also be consistent 
with the view that the corporate governance can reflect endogenous and efficient adjustments 
to the firm‘s environment (Boone & Field, 2007). 
6.1.1 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
Based on the corporate governance index, this study finds that there is a positive and 
significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in Chinese listed 
companies which is consistent with western scholars‘ views on the function of corporate 
governance in the organization. That is, the constituents of firms stand to gain or lose greatly 
depending on the quality and nature of corporate governance because corporate governance 
acts as the structure and process by which an organization‘s assets and activities are overseen 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983b, 1983c; D. C. Hambrick et al., 2008). Meanwhile, the 
results also showed that the corporate governance index is successful in assessing the quality 
of corproate governance in China‘s listed companies. 
Furthermore, the findings in this study have emphasised that there has been the significant 
progress in China‘s corporate governance system over the past 30 years. First, the findings 
show that corporate governance in China has gradually acquired most of the necessary and 
successful components of corporate governance in developed countries, because the basic 
structure of the corporate governance index is consistent with the theoretical framework and 
practice experienced in developed countries and showed that good corporate governance can 
result in better decision making and then better financial performance in Chinese listed 
companies. Therefore, according to the Deloitte survey in 2009, most surveyed Chinese 
companies pursued reforms of governance practices not only to meet regulatory requirements 
but also to meet their company‘s long-term development needs. More specifically, the survey 
showed that 95% of companies see enhancing their company‘s quality of management as a 
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motive for improving corporate governance; 71% of companies wish to improve decision-
making as a motive for the pursuit of improved corporate governance; another 59% and 43% 
of surveyed companies see corporate governance as a way to increase firm value and to gain 
competitive edge, respectively (Deloitte, 2009).  
Second, the goal of China‘s economic reform is to replace the centrally planned system with a 
socialist market economy with China‘s characteristics in terms of the decision issued by CPC 
Central Committee in November 1993. Toward achieving the goal, Chinese listed companies 
have considered an array of policies to perfect the framework of Chinese corporate 
governance because these finding indicated that each policy cannot take account into all crises 
of corporate governance, and has its own limits and its potential adverse effects under the 
changing conditions in China. As Zhang, General Manager of the Shanghai Stock Exchange, 
emphasised (Zhang, 2008), the quality of corporate governance should be improved from a 
variety of perspectives including the behaviour of controlling shareholders, related party 
transactions and transparency in China‘s listed companies. Specifically, listed companies 
should establish a strong policy framework that not only regulate the controlling shareholders‘ 
behaviour such as ownership management, M&A and related party transactions, but also 
strengthen the directors‘ responsibility for the information disclosure and strategic decision 
making. 
6.1.2 Board Size  
As mentioned above, board size is viewed as an important variable that affects decision 
making in the boardroom and then effectiveness of corporate governance. However, there is 
still a debate on the ideal size of the board in the western countries. At the same time, the 
empirical results relating to the effect of board size on financial performance are also mixed. 
Thus, this study provides some dispute resolutions for the effect of board size on financial 
performance in China. That is, this finding showed that there is a reverse U-shape relationship 
between board size and financial performance in Chinese listed companies; specifically, the 
board range from nine and eleven members is positively related to financial performance, in 
the meantime,  there is no relationship between board range below nine and above eleven and 
financial performance. the potential explanation suggests that the optimal board size is the 
balance between incremental cost of communication of decision making and the benefits of 
more experience, knowledge and better advice for the quality of decisions; on the other hand, 
the board size also reflects a trade-off between the firm-specific benefits of increased 
monitoring and the cost of such monitoring (T. Eisenberg et al., 1998b; Yermack, 1995). 
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6.1.3  Independent Directors 
The results indicate that the independent director ratio is not significantly related to firm 
performance, which is inconsistent with the previous findings of western scholars. 
Specifically, based on agency theory, the western scholars suggest that appointing more 
independent directors can protect the interests of shareholders. In China, The reform of 
corporate governance of Chinese listed companies learn from the experience of developed 
countries for reference and also established the independent director mechanism according to 
the Guidelines for introducing independent directors to the board of directors of listed 
companies issued by CSRC in 2001.  
However, this study found that the relationship between the proportion of independent 
directors and financial performance is not significant and negative in Chinese listed 
companies; the potential reasons are that the appointment process and role of independent 
directors in China is different from those in U.S. and other western countries. That is, as Peng 
(2000) indicated, many independent directors in the listed companies built their careers at 
Chinese traditional state-owned companies and have not internalized the need for effective 
board control. As a result, they are only certain cosmetic changes in the composition of 
boards, and cannot influence the effectiveness of the board. That is, as Laura Cha (Cha, 
2001), the former vice chairwoman of CSRC, said, the transformation of corporate 
governance is more in form than in substance. 
Therefore, this study proposes that the process of selecting independent directors should not 
be influenced by the controlling shareholders or the government; that is, the board should 
select independent directors without reference to the controlling shareholders and government 
or those who will side with them in order to enhance the independence of the board and 
underpin its effectiveness in Chinese listed companies.  
6.1.4 Block Shareholders’ holdings  
Some Chinese scholars insist that, if a firm‘s ownership is dispersed, shareholders will have 
adequate incentive to monitor the management and then influence firm performance. 
However, the results showed that block shareholders‘holding had a significant positive effect 
on firm performance in Chinese listed firms, which is consistent with the western view that 
large shareholders have a greater incentives and more resources to monitor the behaviour of 
the managers in order to gain the long-term profit from their investments (Zeckhauser & 
Pound, 1990).  
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Furthermore, the results indicated that corporate governance practice within any single 
country should meet the needs of the country development and be suitable in local conditions, 
because the differences in culture, economic system and legal framework lead to differences 
in the corporate governance structure across countries (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007). 
Therefore, the concentrated ownership in listed companies can prevent the corporate assets 
from being used for purpose that are detrimental to the interests of the minority investors in 
China because the legal protection of shareholders‘ interests is weak in emerging and 
transitional countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997b). 
6.1.5  CEO Duality 
In developed countries, there is still a debate about the impact of CEO duality on firm 
performance. however, this study suggests that we should consider a combination of 
mechanisms of leadership structure based on the firm characteristics, because the leadership 
structure not only can restore the advantage of the separation of CEO and chairman to 
strength directors‘ ability to monitor CEO‘s decision control, but also can reduce  
information, agency and incentive costs which is caused by the separation of CEO and 
chairman (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). 
Specifically, this study set up the CEO duality indicator in terms of the asset size of the firm, 
because a single leadership structure can improve the performance in a small firms; 
conversely, the separation of the CEO and board chair can mitigate the agency cost in large 
firms. Thus this study found that the relationship between the CEO duality indicator and 
financial performance is positive, but not significant. The result indicated that CEO duality 
was related to the financial performance in Chinese listed companies, and cannot effectively 
influence the financial performance in China‘s listed companies. The potential reason may be 
that both the CEO and the chairman who normally are appointed by the government or the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may have extensive ties with the directors and government, 
and must respond to the requirements from the government and the CCP while making 
decisions and cannot view the interests of shareholders as the most important objectives in 
firms (Peng et al., 2007). As a result, board of directors cannot monitor the behaviour of CEO 
effectively. 
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6.2 Moderating Role of Director’s Demographic Characteristics   
In China, the importance of upper echelon theory and directors‘demographic characteristics 
has been recognized by scholars and policy makers. However few scholars considered the 
interactive effect between directors‘ demographic characteristics and corporate governance on 
firm performance in Chinese listed companies. To achieve this, this research has not only 
focused on how the structure of corporate governance affects financial performance but also 
broadened the focus of current research to consider the moderating role of the demographic 
characteristics of board members. Therefore, the research proposed an initial investigation 
into the important interactive effect between corporate governance and directors‘ 
demographic characteristics on firm performance in Chinese listed companies. 
Consequently, the study found that heterogeneity in the demographic characteristics of board 
members can influence the strength of the relationship between corporate governance 
structure and firm performance. Specifically, the heterogeneity of function and tenure and 
average age has a negative effect on the relationship between governance and performance. In 
addition, the research assessed the moderating effect of age heterogeneity and found that 
interactive effect of age heterogeneity and corporate governance is positive; finally, the result 
showed that the interactive effect of average tenure and corporate governance is mixed. In 
summary, these results support our expectation that the directors‘ demographic characteristics 
are important moderators of the hypothesized relationship between corporate governance and 
financial performance in Chinese listed companies.  
There are reasons to explain why the demographic characteristics of directors have important 
effects on the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in China. As 
discussed above, corporate governance acts as the structures and processes that exist in 
oversight roles and responsibilities to influence the financial performance in Chinese firms(D. 
C. Hambrick et al., 2008); this study has found a significantly positive relationship between 
corporate governance index and corporate performance. However, the level of effectiveness 
of corporate governance in listed companies will be influenced not only by the improvement 
of corporate governance structure, but also by the impacts of the cognitive biases, values and 
perception of directors on the monitoring and advisor role of  board of directors in board 
process process. Furthermore, upper echelon theorists (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; D. C. 
Hambrick et al., 1996) used demographic heterogeneity as proxies for the biases, values and 
interests of directors and indicated that  heterogeneity in demographic characteritics will 
create diverse information collection, interpretation and solution generation and then 
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influence the interaction processes on the board and at last the relationship  between corporate 
governance and firm performance. The following subsections will in detail discussed the 
findings of the moderating effect of demographic heterogeneity. 
6.2.1 Average Age as a Moderator 
Consistent with the hypothesis regarding the moderating effect of average age on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, the research found that 
corporate governance is more negatively related to the performance measured by return on 
assets and profit margin when the average age of directors is high. That is, this finding 
showed that the lower average age of directors can strengthen the relationship between 
corporate governance and performance in Chinese listed companies.  
As some western scholars (T. S. Cho & Hambrick, 2006; K. G. Smith et al., 1994a) 
demonstrated, directors with different ages may have different cognition and values to 
generate the differences in behaviour and attitudes toward strategic decisions. In the Chinese 
case, this study indicated that firms should adopt the low average age of the board, because 
the board not only tends to increase the use of new information, skills and knowledge in order 
to act quickly in response to environmental demands, but also avoids becoming conservative 
in the business strategy that consequently lead to the negative consequences of decision-
making when China is transforming from a planned economy toward a market economy  
(Daboub et al., 1995; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). 
6.2.2  Age Heterogeneity as a Moderator 
This study found that heterogeneous age has a positive moderating effect on the strength of 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance.However, the mean and 
standard deviation of heterogeneity in age are only 0.16 and 0.04 respectively, therefore, a 
potential explanation for this result may be that low age heterogeneity will enhance the 
effective pattern of communication and the level of social integration and then contribute to 
the improve the quality of decision-making in the emerging and transitional economy of 
China.  
Additionally, this study also found there are significantly difference between low level of 
heterogeneous age and high level of heterogeneity of function and tenure, and indicated that 
the benefits of board diversity in demographic characteristics will taper off as heterogeneity 
increases, because a high heterogeneous board will generate the differences in behaviour and 
attitudes toward strategic decisions based on their different cognition and values, which will 
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make their communications to become increasing strain and conflict laden in the boardroom 
(Margarethe & Karen, 1992). Therefore, this study also demonstrates that, a moderate 
heterogeneous board not only can improve the frequency of communication to reduce the 
cognitive conflict and increase the effort norms within the board, but also may be able to take 
advantage of innovative suggestion to improve the use of knowledge and skills  based on their 
different experience (T. S. Cho & Hambrick, 2006; K. G. Smith et al., 1994a).  
6.2.3 Functional Heterogeneity and Tenure Heterogeneity as Moderators 
This study found that the positive relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance is weaker when the heterogeneity of directors‘ characteristic is high as opposed 
to when it is low. Specifically, the findings demonstrated that a high degree of heterogeneity 
in the functional track and tenure of board members will reduce the strength of linkage 
between corporate governance and financial performance in Chinese listed companies, which 
is consistent with the argument that heterogeneity of demographic characteristics will lead to 
greater differentiation among board members  and reduce the possibility of sharing resources 
and coordinating in a cohesive manner in the transitional and emerging economy of China. 
That is, heterogeneity in function and tenure will increase the cognitive conflict and reduce 
the effort norms which will influence the efficiency of strategic decision in the boardroom. 
Therefore, this study suggested the board with homogeneous demographic characteristics can 
work efficiently together, is more flexible, and is more productive than where there is 
heterogeneous demography within the board of directors(Alexiev, Jansen, Van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2010). 
In addition, the negative interaction effect also indicates that it is critical for business in China 
to understand and properly utilize Guanxi in order to gain an edge over competitors. The 
Guanxi is a Chinese tradition cultural characteristic and refers to the concept of drawing on a 
web of connections to secure favours in personal and organizational relations in Chinese listed 
firms.Therefore, it has strong implications for interpersonal and interorganizational dynamics 
in Chinese society. (Park & Luo, 2001). This study indicated that high heterogeneity in 
function and tenure of the directors will negatively affect the extent of their Guanxi 
networking to reduce cooperation and govern relationships in Chinese listed companies. On 
the other hand, homogeneous function and tenure may strengthen the Guanxi to not only 
improve the cognitive conflicts and effort norms in board process, but also bridge gaps in 
information and resource flows between unlinked firms and between firms and important 
outside stakeholders (Burt, 1995).  
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6.2.4 Average Tenure as a Moderator  
Similarly, the study also found that average tenure has a negative effect on the association 
between corporate governance and financial performance measured by profit margin. 
Conversely, the interaction effect between corporate governance and average tenure is non-
significantly positive when the performance is measured by return on equity (ROE) in 
Chinese listed companies. This mixed result demonstrates that boards with long average 
tenure in China focus on how much profit the firm can generate with the shareholder equity, 
because the board members with long tenure expect to keep their private interests through the 
existing system of corporate governance and have persistence power to impede strategic 
change (Katz, 1982).  
In contrast,boards with short average tenure will pay attention to the competition and then a 
high level of profit margin because they expect to break the behaviour and precedents and 
change the strategy to adapt to their external changing environment (Bebchuk & Roe, 1999), 
that is, the study suggests that decreased average tenure within the board enable the board to 
confront the challenges and stimulate the firm‘s change and renewal in order to cope with 
uncertainty in the environment and facilitates sustainable competitive advantage. 
In addition, the board of directors in Chinese listed companies is set up in a similar way to the 
boards in the western countries; directors always have tenure contracts for three years that can 
be renewed after the contracts expires. However, because the ultimate control rights such as 
appointment and dismissal of directors still remain in the hands of the CCP and the 
government, the CCP and government can still have strong incentives to maintain their 
position in order to increase their interference through influencing the selection of directors. 
Thus, the another potential reason for the findings is that long-tenured boards have good 
relationship with the CCP and the government and focus on the return on equity in Chinese 
listed, because return on equity is adopted as an important measure to assess the financial 
performance in China by the CCP and the government.  
6.2.5 Concluding Remarks 
To summarize the above discussion, these findings also revealed the effect of environment on 
the directors‘demographic heterogeneity, and lends some weight to Sharfman and Dean‘s 
(1991) discussion of the effect of environment on the activities and behaviours in the firm. 
Therefore, a number of studies indicated that heterogeneous demographic characteristics can 
generate alternatives to facilitate the decision-making, however, the study shows that a 
 96 
homogenous demography has a positive moderating effect on the association between 
corporate governance and financial performance in the emerging and transitional economy of 
China, that is, increasing environmental uncertainty and reform in China requires that the 
board members should strengthen integration and co-operation to quickly  respond to the 
environmental change and determine their strategy, because an unstable and complex 
environment will require the firm to remain flexible and adaptive to improve the cognitive 
conflicts and effort norms in order to reducing the costs of coordination. 
In addition, the mixed impacts of these moderating variables have also revealed that political 
costs play an important role in Chinese corporate governance when the government is still the 
controlling shareholder in listed companies of China. Specifically, China‘s government has 
launched a programme to decentralize the managerial decision rights of SOEs from the 
government to the firm level, however,this corporatization process, which is called 
privatization by western scholars, still prohibited the government from selling its controlling 
stake to other inverstors (Fan et al., 2007). Therefore, as Qian (1996)  noted, government 
control leads to not only the high agency cost due to the lack of accountability in executives, 
but also the high political cost related to the political interference by the government. For 
instance, this study found that the most directors who are appointed by the government lack 
the specific experience and appropriate skills of business management in the state-owned 
firms. In addition, these findings also indicated that many government officers are selected as 
chairman and independent directors on the board, and are relatively weak in monitoring the 
behaviour of managers in state-owned listed companies, because they have good relationships 
with the government and state-owned shareholders, and do not consider maximizing the 
shareholder‘value as the most importance objective for the board of directors in Chinese listed 
companies. To summarize, the politically-connected directors have a negative impact on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. 
6.3 Contributions  
To date, the driving force of corporate governance reform is still to simply meet the 
regulatory requirements in China‘s listed companies; however, the study encourages listed 
companies to take a more comprehensive approach to perfect their governance system. That 
is, this study conducts an initial probe to integrate the demographic characteristics of directors 
into the corporate governance system in order to enrich the conceptual framework of 
corporate governance and perfect the effectiveness of corporate governance. Therefore, these 
findings have made several contributions to the study of corporate governance. Firstly, the 
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study constructs a corporate governance index to evaluate the quality of corporate governance 
from the perspectives of ownership structure and board structure and build a link between 
corporate governance and financial performance in Chinese listed companies. Secondly, I 
establish a new conceptual model to enrich our understanding of corporate governance 
through integrating directors‘ demographic characteristics into to the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. Thirdly, the result shows that there is a positive 
and significant relationship between corporate governance and firm performance based on the 
corporate governance index; however, compared with those in western countries, this study 
also found that corporate governance indicators have different effects on financial 
performance in Chinese listed companies. Forth, the empirical study validated the moderating 
impact of directors‘ demographic characteristics and contributes to the confirmation of the 
linkage between corporate governance, demographic characteristics and firm performance. At 
last,  the research provides an initial integration approach to improve the effectiveness of 
corporate governance and suggests a more comprehensive understanding of the system of 
corporate governance because prior studies often ignored some important intervening 
variables that can have significant moderating impacts on the corporate governance system. 
Specically, the first contribution is that this study comprehensively examines the association 
between corporate governance and firm performance. Although a large number of researchers 
have taken into account a single specific aspect of corporate governance, this study applies a 
corporate governance index to assess the quality of corporate governance and focuses on the 
effect of overall corporate governance on financial performance from the perspective of 
ownership structure and board structure. More specifically, the CG index is a combination of 
four proxies of outcome of corporate governance in the dimensions of the ownership 
structure, board size, independent director ratio and CEO duality. As a result, first, this study 
establishes a corporate governance index to find the effectiveness of corporate governance in 
Chinese listed companies, secondly it provides a comprehensive perspective on understanding 
the significantly positive relationship and showed that mechanisms of corporate governance 
can be complementary to each other, at last, the evidences of the corporate governance index 
from China are also expected to be useful to other emerging economies that have a weak legal 
framework and weak system of property rights protection.  
The second contribution is that the mixed results of the governance indicators in Chinese 
listed companies emphasized that good corporate governance should meet the needs of its 
institutional conditions and enviroment. That is, an arrangement of corporate governance must 
be situated in a specific historical, social and organizational context because institutional 
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differences give rise to governance arrangements that are suitable, not in a universal sense, 
but rather specifically for the individual firm and the context in which it is situated (Qian, 
2000). 
More specifically, the results show that board size and block shareholders‘ holdings were 
significantly positive with the financial performance. However, the results do not support the 
impact of the CEO duality and independent directors on the financial performance, and are 
not consistent with prior results of some developed countries, these findings demonstrate that 
the current reform of corporate governance in China should  not adopt the ―one-size-fits-all‖ 
approach to impose developed countries‘ models for chinese corporate governance (Qian, 
2000). The potential explanation is that, the China‘s government not only acts as regulator to 
monitor the listed companies, but also as the block holder to exercise shareholder control 
rights in the process of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a decentralized 
market economy. 
The third contribution of this study is that the research establishes an integrated research 
model to investigate that there is an important moderating effect of the demographic 
characteristics of directors on the relationship between corporate governance and financial 
performance measured by return on assets and profit margin. Specifically, based on the upper 
echelon theory ,the study not only explains that directors‘demographic characteristics can 
influence the effectiveness of corporate governance through integrating upper echelon theory 
into conventional  corporate governance framework , but also emphasize that the 
homogeneous demography has a singnificant impact on the level of relationship between 
Chinese corporate governance and firm performance. 
Meanwhile, these findings also explained that it is necessary for government authorities to 
issue a series of regulations and policies to strength the importance of the demographic 
characteristics of directors in corporate governance. For instance, Code of Corporate 
Governance for listed companies in China emphasised that the board of directors will possess 
adequate professional background (including: knowledge, skills and qualities) to perform their 
duties; in addition, the Code also emphasis that independent directors must bear the 
responsibilities of due diligence toward the listed company and perform their duties in 
accordance with laws and regulations (CSRC, 2002). 
The fourth contribution of this study is that, consistent with hypotheses regarding the 
moderating effect of directors‘ demographic characteristics on the relationship between 
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corporate governance and performance, the empirical results further validates the moderating 
impact of directors‘ demographic characteristics (including: average age, age heterogeneity, 
functional heterogeneity, average tenure and tenure heterogeneity) on the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance and indicates that interaction 
between directors‘demographic heterogeneity and corporate governance can strongly impact 
financial performance in Chinese listed companies. In sum, the empirical findings contribute 
to the confirmation of the linkage between corporate governance, demographic characteristics 
and firm performance. 
The fifth contribution is that the integrated model not only enrich the existing academic 
framework of corporate governance through combining demographic characteristics into 
corporate governance, but also offer us with a new way for further integration of other 
important intervening factors into corporate governance. That is, the research provides an 
initial integration approach to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance and suggests 
a more comprehensive understanding of the system of corporate governance because previous 
studies often ignored some important intervening variables that can have significant 
moderating impacts on the effectiveness of corporate governance.  
In conclusion, despite the perception of corporate governance and the theoretical concept of 
upper echelon theory are introduced from western developed countries, this study suggested 
that China cannot simply and fully copy the whole framework of corporate governance in 
developed countries, but should strength the reform and innovation in corporate governance 
system based on institutional conditions and environment in China. Towards the goal, China‘s 
listed companies still confront a number of challenges ahead. Next, this study provides new 
insights into the reform of Chinese corporate governance. 
6.4 Policy Implications  
An integrative and comprehensive view of the moderating effect of demographic 
characteristics on the relationship between corporate governance and financial performance 
has emerged from this study; at the same time, several important policy implications can be 
drawn from this synthesis. 
From the micro perspective, firstly, the findings suggested that the government should further 
clarify directors‘ exact rights and responsibilities to increase the effectiveness of the existing 
laws and regulations framework of corporate governance. More specifically, policymakers 
and academics should further improve the framework of laws and regulations to provide the 
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detailed and clear requirements for the key functions, roles and responsibilities of the boards 
in China, as a result, these policies should not only promote directors to develop their 
independent thinking and exercise their rights to freedom of judgements, but also remind 
them to recognize the consequences of their decisions in Chinese listed firms, briefly, these 
policies for Chinese listed companies should  keep the balance between directors‘ 
responsibility and right in order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of board of 
directors. 
For example, the revised Company law of China only defined the basic legal responsibility 
and right of the board, such as the appointment of general managers and assessment of 
important strategies. Similarly, The Code of Corporate Governance for listed companies in 
China only described the simple duties and responsibilities of the directors, that is, directors 
should perform their duties for the best interests of the firm and all the shareholders, directors 
shall abide by relevant laws, regulations, rules and the company‘s articles of association. 
However, compared with the OECD principle of corporate governance (2004), the policy 
makers should consider adopting clearly articulated rules and regulations to shape the 
behaviour of board member and achieve the effectiveness of corporate governance as follows, 
1.   the board should review not only strategic decision but also risk management that should 
include corporate strategy, the plan of action, risk policy, annual budgets, setting performance 
objectives and monitoring corporate performance;  
2.    the board shall align key executives and board remuneration with the longer term 
interests of the company and its shareholders; the board shall monitor the conflict of interests 
of management, board members and shareholders including the misuse of corporate assets and 
abuse in related party transactions;  
 
3.    directors shall ensure the integrity of corporation‘s accounting and financial reporting 
system, otherwise, directors will fail to perform their functions and cannot ensure the board‘s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders (OECD, 2004).  
Secondly, China should integrate directors‘ demographic characteristics into the evaluation 
system of the board of directors in order to strength the implementation of corporate 
governance, because demographic characteristics are important moderating variables that 
influence the quality of information processing and strategic decisions within board of 
directors and then the effectiveness of corporate governance.  
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Until recently, the primary focus of Chinese scholars and policymakers is still  about how to 
improve the effectiveness of corporate governance through optimizing the corporate 
governance structure, however, this study indicated that the effectiveness of corporate 
governance is driven not only by the improvement of governance structure, but also by the 
heterogeneity in demographic characteristics of directors. Therefore, China should develop an 
intergrated policy framework of corporate governance that combines the corporate 
governance structure with the specific requirement for the directors‘ demographic 
characteristics (including: age, functional track, knowledge and tenure) in order to strength 
the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. Especially, the State-
Owned listed companies should focus on the evaluation of the management capability and 
skills of directors (such as strategic decision-making, finance and law), because these listed 
companies often cannot consider importance role of the board which is responsible to 
determines the strategic direction and monitor the behaviour of managers, and always 
appointed some government officer to be members of the board , although these officers lack 
sufficient  management knowledge and skills, or confidence to serve as directors in the listed 
companies (J. Wu, 1994).  
Thirdly, China‘s listed companies should strength the training and education of the directors 
to enhance the board‘s functions and directors‘ skill and knowledge. In the developed 
countries, it is necessary to professionalize the director in listed companies in order to 
improve the efficiency and effectiveness of corporate governance. For instance, as the 
Singapore Institute of  Directors (2002) indicated, an effective board is central to good 
corporate governance and skill, moreover, the knowledge of directors is central to the board 
effectiveness, therefore, the institute introduced a company directors‘ course that included 
four modules: the company and corporate directorship, getting the best from your board, 
strategic management and finance, and consequently hopes to promote the professional 
development of directors and corporate leaders and encourage the highest standards of 
corporate governance and ethical conduct. However, although the Code of Corporate 
Governance of Chinese listed companies (CSRC, 2001) has suggested that directors should 
attend relevant training to learn about the rights, obligations and duties of a director, this 
study suggests that China should draw on the successful experience in developed countries to 
build an independent institute of company directors to provide the specific training for 
directors, as a result , the regulators and listed companies can comprehensively assess the 
quality of the candidates of directors and can systematically identify the directors based on the 
market principles . 
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Fourth, Chinese enterprises should adopt a Code of Ethics and Conduct for Directors to 
regulate the behaviour of directors. So far, China‘s listed companies specify the director‘s 
responsibilities and duties only in terms of the company law and relevant regulations. 
However, these current law and regulations cannot systematically set out the responsibilities 
and duties of directors on basis of business ethics and conduct, and then not only lead to a 
series of moral problems including moral hazard and adverse selection, but also influence the 
level of cognitive conflict and effort norms within interaction process of board members.  
However, in developed countries, listed companies always issued ethics guidelines to define 
the conduct of members of board in the business ( including: personal conduct , the protection 
of firm‘s asset, obligations in conducting firm‘s business with other people and organization, 
conflicts of interest and other considerations affecting the firm) and can effectively regulate 
the behaviour of board members (IBM, 2009). Therefore, the thesis suggests that the listed 
companies should learn from the successful experience of developed countries and issue a 
code of ethics and conduct to control the type of board behaviour in order to improve 
financial performance and the long-term sustainability. 
From a macro perspective, first, China needs an optimal relationship among government, 
state-owned supervision commission, listed companies, board of directors and managers in 
order to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of corporate governance system. So far, 
China still has a multiple-tier governance monitoring system that cannot keep direct and clear 
linkages between principal and agents as follows, 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The Governance Control Line of Chinese SOE 
As a result, the system will negatively influence the corporate governance in Chinese listed 
companies, because the board in the listed companies often miss their target and cannot adopt 
the effective policies and principles to serve the interests of shareholders. Therefore, the 
research imply that China should further shorten the control line of the Chinese SOE to clarify 
the relationship between government, state-owned supervision, SOE and listed companies,and 
to specify responsibilities and rights of shareholders, the board of directors and managers.  
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Second, this study suggests that corporate governance in China should make a transition 
toward more formal methods of the reform of corporate governance. That is, the reform of 
corporate governance should be a process to drive from relationship-based governance to 
evolve eventually into rule-based governance. More specifically, Li(2003) provide a detailed 
explanation for this suggestion from a cost perspective. Before rule-based governance is 
established, organizations mainly use the relation-based governance whereby personal 
agreements between two parties are based on their mutual relationship and relies on local 
information and involves few fixed costs, but significant marginal costs, as a result, the 
relation-based governance is non-transparent and incompatible.  
However, with the expansion of business, the average costs of relation-based governance will 
increase due to the rising marginal costs of private monitoring, therefore, scholars suggested 
that organizations should adopt the rule-based governance because it largely depends on 
public information and involve large total fixed transaction costs including the costs of 
drafting, interpreting and implementing contracts, but few marginal costs. The average cost of 
rule-based governance will decrease owing to the large fixed costs and negligible marginal 
costs. In China, listed companies still largely depend on relationship-based governance 
because of the impact of the Chinese tradition culture and institutions‘ enviroment on 
corporate governance. However, China is a transition and emerging economy with rapid 
business expansion;  thus, successful corporate governance requires a important  shift from 
relation-based to rule-based governance in order to meet the demand of  investors and 
regulators (J. S. Li, 2003).  
To summarize the discussion above, as scholars (Bergh & Lawless, 1998; Rowley, Behrens, 
& Krackhardt, 2000) indicated, the effectiveness of corporate governance practices will 
depend on the threats and opportunities within a particular firm environment. Thus the 
findings show that some policies and regulations designed for western economies may be 
ineffective in emerging and transitional economy of China. For example, some board 
characteristics that prove the beneficial for listed firms in developed countries have not 
significantly positive effect on the financial performance in the transitional economy of 
China, because the ultimate control rights, such as selection and dismissal of directors and 
approval of important investment project, still remain in the hands of the CCP and the 
government. In addition, this study also find that the dispersed ownership structure as a 
solution to the principal-agent problem in U.S. and U.K. can not improve the effectivenss of 
corporate governance in Chinese listed companies, the reasons are that  these governance 
mechanisms are characterized by strong securities markets, rigorous disclosure standards, 
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high share turnover, and high market transparency in those developed countries (Coffee, 
2005). Therefore, in order to improve corporate governance in China, scholars and 
policymakers must pay close attention to China-specific level of economic and institutional 
development in comparison with developed countries and takes different measures to improve 
the corporate governance framework(Qian, 1996). 
Furthermore, China should focus on the role of the macro-level institutional in improving the 
framework of corporate governance, and change their corporate governance from a 
governance model of political control to a market-determined governance model in order to 
minimize the influence of the administrative function of government and the traditional 
planned economic system, because some unique institutional features which are specific to the 
transitional and emerging economy of China have shaped the development of Chinese 
corporate governance. Specifically, as dicussed above, the CCP and the Chinese government 
not only affect the decision making through appointment and dismissal of directors and CEO, 
but also determine the ownership transformation through concentrated ownership structure, as 
a result, the close relationship between the CCP, the government and listed companies 
extremely influence the independence of assets, business, human resources, and finance and 
organization structure and then affected the effectiveness of corporate governance in Chinese 
listed companies.Therefore, Chinese listed companies should  reduce the interest conflict with 
both the CCP and the government  through the separation of government and enterprise and 
improve the effectiveness of corporate governance by developing a market-determined model 
of corporate governance. 
6.5 Limitations and Future Research 
This study has examined the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance and 
interaction effects between corporate governance and demographic diversity. However, there 
are some limitations in this research. First, data are drawn from the SSE Index, which not 
only limits alternative explanations for performance and directors‘ demegraphic 
characteristics, but also influence the general explanation of the findings of this research. In 
addition, the research gathers from secondary data to indentify several critical demographics 
characteristics of directors in the Chinese listed companies, therefore this study can only make 
inferences regarding the effects of directors‘ demographic heterogeneity on the relationship 
between corporate governance and financial performance. That is, future research needs to 
focus on data drawn from a comprehensive perspective to improve the explanation.  
 105 
Secondly, the study integrated only four important variables of corporate governance 
structure:  ownership structure, board size, board composition and board leadership structure, 
into the research framework. However, there is a variety of other important governance 
variables that have important effects on financial performance and are not included in this 
framework,such as ownership of directors and managers (Morck, 1988; Zahra, 1996 ), state-
owned shares (Broadman, 1999), in Chinese listed firms. Briefly, these variables also offer 
another avenue for future study from other angles of corporate governance structure.  
In addition, this study only investigated some directors‘ demographic characteristics including 
age, functional track and tenure; however, other characteristics (such as education, gender and 
so on) might also strongly influence the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance. Furthermore, as Zahra and Pearce (1989) indicated, there are some common 
reasons for the inconsistent findings about the effect of the corporate governance structure on 
the firm performance:  
1. Researchers often ignore the impact of the contextual factor, such as industry, 
organizational life cycle, and corporate strategy;  
2. Researchers do not effectively consider the effect of interaction among board members 
on decision making; and  
3. Scholars often emphasized univariate analytical approaches and consider board 
attributes in isolation and ultimately make comparisons and integration across studies 
difficult.  
therefore, there exists not only too many intervening individuals and processes between 
boards of directors and firm performance, but also too many potential contingency factors that 
might affect how boards can influence performance outcomes(Finkelstein, Cannella, et al., 
2008). The future research should take account of other important intervening factors in order 
to develop this research model.  
Thirdly, the study has assessed the interactive relationship between the demographic 
characteristics and corporate governance; however, I also acknowledge the possibility that 
demographic characteristics can influence the individual governance variables. For instance, 
the heterogeneity of age and functional track in the firm may affect the board size and 
independent direction ratio in the boardroom. Conversely, the ownership structure may not 
only have a strong effect on the board structure but also influences the level of board diversity 
including average age, heterogeneity of age, tenure and functional track. Therefore, future 
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research should take the interaction relationship of these variables into account in exploring 
the new measures to improve the effectiveness of corporate governance. 
Fourthly, the interaction effect of the corporate governance structure and demographic 
characteristics on financial performance motivates us to further consider the impact of human 
behaviour in the future research. That is, previous researchers studied corporate governance 
based on the traditional paradigm that assumes rational behaviour and maximization of 
expected utility(Simon, 2000). However, the moderating role of the demographic 
characteristics in this study indicated that scholars and policy makers did not know what they 
did not know (Logan, 2009) and cannot think of all the possible outcomes (Dréze, 1978) in 
the field of corporate governance. Thus this study implies that they should further focus on 
the effect of psychological and organization factors in the future corporate governance 
research. 
Finally, the research takes advantage of a special window of opportunity for corporate 
governance reform in China, because China is in the process of transition and gradually issued 
a large number of regulations and laws of corporate governance during the period 2004-2008. 
For example, the revised corporate law and Securities law came into force, the SASAC issued 
the Guidelines for central enterprise comprehensive risk management, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange also released the Guidelines for the internal control 
of listed companies. Furthermore, in 2007, CSRC announced the information disclosure 
management measures. As a result, the government is gradually establishing the complete 
standards and framework of corporate governance in China. However, this study also shows 
that, although the governance mechanisms for Chinese listed companies are sufficiently 
developed, policymakers and scholars should further perfect the framework of corporate 
governance because mixed results indicated that the present policies and regulations of 
corporate governance  still too principle and disorder to meet the needs of development of the 
firms, therefore, future research should comprehensively investigate the development of 
corproate governance and pay attentions to intervening factors that influence the association 
between corporate governance and financial performance in order to improve the framework 
of corporate governance. 
6.6 Conclusions 
2011 marked the thirty-third year of enterprise reform in China in the transition from a 
planned to a market economy; meanwhile, the lessons from the current financial crisis also 
show that reform of corporate governance should enter a new stage in China. Therefore, this 
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study suggest that academics and policy makers should not only comprehensively focus on 
the main problems in the patterns of corporate governance and relationships among the 
concepts of corproate governance, but also take new measures to perfect the governance 
system and develop an integrated framework of corporate governance to meet the demands of 
unique and country-specific governance environment in China. 
From a theoretical perspective, previous research on corporate governance traditionally 
concerned the direct relationship between governance structure and firm performance, while 
ignoring intervening variables that significantly influence the level of this relationship. This 
study presents an integrated theoretical framework to investigate the moderating effect of 
demographic characteristics of directors on this relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. Specifically, as SEC Chair Mary Schapiro (2009) indicated, the current 
economic crisis has led many investors to raise serious concerns about the accountability and 
responsiveness of  boards of directors to the interests of shareholders. Therefore, this thesis 
has extracted the important variables from the previous literature and enriched a theoretical 
framework to discuss the linkage among corporate governance, directors‘ demographic 
characteristics and firm performance. In summary, when adding demographic characteristics, 
this study provide an important signal that a number of intervening variables seriously 
influence the strength of the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
performance.  
From practice perspectives, this study not only found that corporate governance has a 
significantly positive impact on financial performance in Chinese listed firms, but also 
indicated that directors‘ demographic characteristics can moderate the strength of the effect of 
corporate governance on firm performance. That is, the empirical research further suggested 
that the listed companies should pay more attention to the interaction between corporate 
governance and demographic characteristics in order to strength the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance. In summary, this study provides academics and 
practitioners a richer and more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between 
corporate governance and firm performance.   
To conclude, although we still face a lot of challenges to improve the effectiveness of 
corporate governance system in China, I expect that this study may be viewed as an initial 
investigation of the interactive effect of corporate governance and demographic 
characteristics on firm performance; and represents an important step toward improving the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in Chinese listed firms. That is, it gives the 
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shareholders another important approach to protect their interests, creates a measure to detect 
behaviour of the board members and provide us with a new perspective for enhancing the 
knowledge and practice of corporate governance.  
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     Appendix A 
A.1  Correlation Relationship 
 
ROE 
profit 
margin 
Board Size 
Indicator 
Independent 
Director Ratio 
Indicator 
Block 
Shareholders 
‗holding Indicator 
CEO Duality 
Indicator 
CG  
Index(CGI) 
ROE 1 0.333(**) 0.092(*) -0.01 0.115(**) 0.049 0.119(**) 
Profit margin   1 0 -0.012 0.116(**) 0.038 0.06 
Board Size Indicator     1 0.226(**) 0.004 -0.121(**) 0.587(**) 
Independent Director Ratio Indicator       1 -0.109(**) -0.081(*) 0.421(**) 
Block Shareholders ‗holding Indicator         1 0.237(**) 0.461(**) 
CEO Duality Indicator           1 0.575(**) 
CG Index(CGI)             1 
Average Age               
Age Heterogeneity               
Function Heterogeneity               
Tenure Heterogeneity               
Average Tenure               
Log Assets               
Debt/assets               
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Average Age 
Age 
Heterogeneity 
Function 
Heterogeneity 
Tenure 
Heterogeneity 
Average 
Tenure 
LOG 
Asset 
Debt/ 
assets 
ROE 0.056 -0.043 -0.121(**) -0.027 -0.026 0.067 -0.130(**) 
profit margin 0.165(**) -0.02 -0.026 -0.015 -0.06 0.037 -0.406(**) 
Board Size Indicator -0.044 0.044 -0.002 0.096(*) -0.067 -0.142(**) -0.006 
Independent Director Ratio Indicator -0.02 -0.059 -0.072 -0.007 0.001 -0.136(**) 0.058 
Block Shareholders‘ holding Indicator 0.125(**) -0.036 -0.017 -0.108(**) -0.113(**) 0.127(**) -0.088(*) 
CEO Duality Indicator 0.257(**) 0.02 -0.018 -0.091(*) 0.043 0.553(**) 0.107(**) 
CG Index(CGI) 0.164 0.002 -0.045 -0.041 -0.053 0.240(**) 0.05 
Average Age 1 0.011 0.093(*) -0.059 0.07 0.457(**) -.109(**) 
Age Heterogeneity  1 -0.167(**) -0.002 0.097(*) -0.074 -0.067 
Function Heterogeneity   1 0.107(**) -0.043 0.028 -0.035 
Tenure Heterogeneity    1 0.078(*) -0.023 -0.054 
Average Tenure     1 0.043 0.017 
Log Assets      1 0.150(**) 
Debt/assets       1 
Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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A.2 Summary of Empirical Results 
                                                                                                          0.026** 
                                                                                                           -0.001 
                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                      0.016*** 
                                                                                                              0.035** 
                                                                                                               0.002 
                                                                  
                                                                 -0.002*                       0.054               -0.128**                  0.0004                    -0.038*          
                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
 
 
Board size indicator  
Corporate 
Governance Index  
Independent director 
ratio indicator  
Block shareholders‘ 
holding indicator  
CEO duality 
indicator  
Return on Equity 
Average Age Age 
heterogeneity  
Function 
heterogeneity 
Average 
Tenure  
 
Tenure 
Heterogeneity 
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                                                                                                          0.001 
                                                                                                           0.013 
                                                                                                                                                 
                                                                                                                                                      0.009* 
                                                                                                              0.028* 
                                                                                                               0.006 
                                                                  
                                                                 -0.002*                    0.207*                   -0.005                -0.011***                 -0.043*                                                                                       
 
 
              Note: ***, ** and * represent the significance level at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively 
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